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Words We Fear
BURNING TWEETS & THE POLITICS OF
INCITEMENT
Rachel E. VanLandingham
†
INTRODUCTION
A steady stream of U.S. officials, both elected and in the
executive branch—Senators, Representatives, the FBI Director,
and so forth—have loudly condemned terrorists’ use of social
media.
1
And not just any use. The official red, white, and blue
damning drumbeat has been loudest regarding terrorist groups’
use of social media to radicalize, recruit, and propagandize. Over
the last decade and a half, the refrain that social media has been
used as a proselytization tool has echoed throughout congressional
and executive branch statements. It is a sentiment uttered in
frequent congressional hearings and FBI press releases on the
matter—this refrain has particularly echoed with growing
frequency in the last five years.
2
As demonstrated in the following short excerpts, U.S.
officials occasionally, and appropriately, express concern specifically
about terrorist groups’ tactical use of social media as a
communication platform to plan and plot attacks. Yet that is not the
sentiment most often expressed in countless congressional hearings
†
Rachel E. VanLandingham, Lt Col, USAF, (ret.), is a Professor of Law at
Southwestern Law School in Los Angeles, California where she teaches criminal law,
criminal procedure, and national security law. She thanks the Brooklyn Law Review for its
thoughtful symposium prompting this article, and Emily Hart for her research assistance.
1
This article uses the following terms in this manner:
[T]errorists are those individuals who support or commit ideologically
motivated violence to further political, social, or religious goals; radicalization
is the process by which individuals enter into terrorism; and terrorism is an
act that involves the threatened or actual use of ideologically motivated
violence to further political, social, or religious goals.
ALLISONG.SMITH, NAT’L INST.OF JUSTICE, NCJ 250171, HOWRADICALIZATION TOTERRORISM
OCCURS IN THEUNITEDSTATES:WHATRESEARCHSPONSORED BY THENATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICETELLSUS 1 n.1 (2018), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250171.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F4CN-Q5RL] [hereinafter HOWRADICALIZATIONTOTERRORISMOCCURS].
2
See infra Section I.A.
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and FBI press releases regarding terrorist content online. Instead,
the government has focused on the use of social media by extremist
groups to radicalize, recruit, and propagandize, amuch broader, and
largely protected, range of speech. In 2011, a Representative opened
a congressional hearing with the statement:
One common theme throughout all of these hearings was that
terrorist networks are spreading their message, recruiting
sympathizers, and are connecting operationally on-line.
For years, terrorists have communicated on-line, sharing al-
Qaeda propaganda or writing in on-line forums dedicated entirely to
the prospect of Islamist terrorism. . . . The same place the average
person posts photos and communicates with family and friends are
being used by enemies to distribute videos praising Osama bin Laden.
Terrorists also disseminate diatribes glorifying the murder of
innocents and even make connections with each other intentionally or
internationally to plot attacks.
3
Leapfrog to the January 2018 “Terrorist and Social Media:
#IsBigTechDoingEnough?” Senate committee hearing. Senator
John Thune stated: “Violent Islamic terrorist groups like ISIS have
been particularly aggressive in seeking to radicalize and recruit
over the Internet and various social media platforms. . . . Instances
of Islamic terrorists using social media platforms to organize,
instigate, and inspire are well documented.”
4
His first example in
support of such social media inspiration was the 2016 Orlando
Pulse nightclub mass shooting, which he characterized as
“reportedly inspired” by material posted on social media.
5
Fast-forward again, this time to September 2019, to yet
another Senate hearing during which officials from Facebook,
Google, and Twitter were once again grilled regarding their
companies’ efforts to remove terrorism-related content from their
platforms.
6
The Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee Chairman opened the “Mass Violence, Extremism,
and Digital Responsibility” hearing by describing the links
3
Jihadist Use of Social Media—How to Prevent Terrorism and Preserve
Innovation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Counterterrorism & Intelligence of the H.
Comm. onHomeland Sec. & Intelligence, 112th Cong. 1–2 (2012) (statement of Rep. Patrick
Meehan, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Counterterrorism and Intelligence).
4
Terrorism and Social Media: #IsBigTechDoingEnough?: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 115th Congress 1 (2018) [hereinafter Terrorism and
Social Media 2018 Hearing] (emphasis added) (statement of Sen. John Thune, Chairman,
S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp.).
5
Id. at 1–2.
6
Tony Romm&DrewHarwell, Facebook, Google and Twitter Face Fresh Heat
from Congress on Harmful Online Content, WASH POST. (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/09/18/facebook-google-twitter-face-fresh-heat-
congress-harmful-online-content/ [https://perma.cc/Y2ET-49NH].
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between social media and several terrorist incidents, explaining
that the August 2019 El Paso shooter had uploaded a “manifesto”
of extremism prior to the attack, and then repeated the oft-cited
example of the 2016 Orlando Pulse nightclub mass shooting
perpetrator’s alleged social media-drawn inspiration.
7
So what is the problem with such expressions of official
concern? The problemwith sustained U.S.-governmental attention
to such peripheral, albeit serious, social media contributions to acts
of terrorism is that the speech under the microscope is
constitutionally protected from government action, yet government
pressure often causes private entities to act. Terrorist
proselytization, the type of speech Congress in particular is
concerned with, is well within the First Amendment’s aegis. In
protecting speech that glorifies violence and praises terrorism, the
Constitution prohibits government suppression of much of the
speech used to radicalize, recruit, and propagandize terrorism that
so worries our elected and unelected government officials.
This article is not alarmed by governmental suppression,
through criminal punishment or otherwise, of speech the First
Amendment does not shield, such as that used to direct terrorist
attacks using social media. The First Amendment does not
protect speech that is integral to crime, nor other crime-enabling
speech such as that used to solicit, conspire, conduct, plot, or to
direct a terrorist attack, regardless whether said speech is
communicated via social media, over the phone, or shouted from
a rooftop.
8
This article instead sounds the alarm regarding the
considerable governmental pressure regularly directed at social
media companies regarding their regulation of protected speech
on their platforms, despite congressional—and seemingly some
scholars’—protests to the contrary.
9
7
Mass Violence, Extremism, and Digital Responsibility: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. onCommerce, Sci.&Transp., 116thCong. (2019) (video statement of Sen.RogerWicker,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp.), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2019/
9/mass-violence-extremism-and-digital-responsibility [https://perma.cc/YG2A-74ZV].
8
See infra Section II.A (noting protected and unprotected categories of speech).
Further, the federal material support to terrorism statute and the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the statute’s interplay with the First Amendment means the Constitution
appropriately does not shield speech uttered by foreign terrorist groups themselves, nor
speech disseminated on such groups’ behalf if the speaker is in coordinationwith such groups,
even if such speech, without the connection, would otherwise be protected. See generally
Rachel E. VanLandingham, Jailing the Twitter Bird: Social Media, Material Support to
Terrorism, andMuzzling the Modern Press, 39 CARDOZOL. REV. 1, 43–44 (2017) [hereinafter
Jailing the Twitter Bird] (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 2339B prohibits the knowing provision of a
service to a terrorist group, such as money, a communications platform; and uttering helpful
speech in coordination with such a group also passes constitutional muster).
9
Professor Alexander Tsesis, a leading scholar in this area, surprisingly
claims that “[t]he First Amendment right to engage like-minded people, to express one’s
views, and to disseminate information, even in statements supportive of violent political
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For example, the Chairman of the House Committee on
Homeland Security opened a June 2019 public congressional
hearing on harmful social media communication linked to
terrorism by noting that:
This Committee will continue to engage social media companies about
the challenges they face in addressing terror content on their
platforms. In addition to terror content, I want to hear from our panel
about how they are working to keep hate speech and harmful
misinformation off their platforms. I want to be very clear—
Democrats respect the free speech rights enshrined in the First
Amendment, but much of the content I am referring to is either not
protected speech or violates the social media companies’ own terms of
service.
10
Representative Thompson’s words and the actions of his and
other congressional committees starkly belie his claim that he
and his party respect the First Amendment right to free speech.
At least in this Committee, the First Amendment’s free speech
clause receives short shrift. In his statement, Representative
Thompson admits that he and his colleagues want the leading
social media companies to censor speech that the government
cannot censor or suppress, at least not according to the Supreme
Court’s modern interpretation of the speech clause. Since
Congress cannot directly suppress such speech by criminally
punishing it, members of Congress want private actors in the
form of the internet’s largest social media platforms to act as the
book-burners instead.
In other words, the House Committee on Homeland
Security seemingly supports censorship, not the First Amendment;
it seemingly supports the regulation and suppression of speech by
private proxy, not respect for the “freedom to express ‘the
thought[s] that we hate.’”
11
Given the types of expression
Representative Thompson and others want restricted, however,
there is little political or other pushback, nor is there concern from
domestic constituencies. This lack of attention is understandable,
because who wants to stand up for speech that glorifies violence
such as terrorism or expresses hate toward racial minorities and
religious groups? Yet it is worth asking whether Congress should
action, does not extend to conduct that advances violent terrorist activities.” Alexander
Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 651, 664 (2017).
10
ExaminingSocialMediaCompanies’ Efforts to CounterOnline Terror Content and
Misinformation:HearingBefore theH.Comm.onHomelandSec., 116thCong. (2019) (statement
of Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, Comm on Homeland Sec.), https://homeland.house.
gov/imo/media/doc/062619%20BGT%20Open%20Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/PX6W-G8A
G] [hereinafterExamining Social Media 2019Hearing Rep. Thompson Statement].
11
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (plurality opinion) (quoting United
States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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do what this article claims it is doing—engaging in de facto speech
suppression by pressuring private companies (who are not bound
by the First Amendment’s speech-protective rules
12
) to restrict
speech that the Supreme Court has found worthy of First
Amendment protection from direct governmental regulation.
That the July 2019 congressional hearing was meant to
pressure social media
13
companies to further restrict First
Amendment-protected speech seems clear by how Representative
Thompson described the committee’s concerns. The Chairman’s
second broad social media speech category included speech that
“violates the social media companies’ own terms of service,”
14
which, by his own binary, is distinct from speech already
unprotected by the First Amendment;
15
it is speech protected by
the First Amendment.
16
The Representative and his Committee
wanted to further pressure social media companies to continue
enforcing their platforms’ own content restrictions regarding
protected speech. In a nutshell, this article notes that these
content restrictions were developed largely as a response to early
congressional and government pressure and restrict speech the
government cannot constitutionally regulate as contemplated;
this article asks whether this suppression by proxy is functionally
and normatively desirable.
Facebook’s
17
restriction of socialmedia content demonstrates
that Representative Thompson’s demand that social media
companies more strictly enforce their own content bans was a direct
call to suppress First Amendment protected speech. Facebook, like
other leading social media platforms, has banned numerous types of
12
See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
13
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security defines social media as “web-based
and mobile technologies that turn communication into an interactive dialogue in a variety of
on-line fora.” DHS Monitoring of Social Networking and Media: Enhancing Intelligence
Gathering and Ensuring Privacy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Counterterrorism &
Intelligence, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 12 (2012) (joint statement of Mary
Ellen Callahan, Chief Privacy Officer, Dept of Homeland Sec., and Richard Chávez, Dir.,
Office of Operations Coordination and Planning, Dep’t of Homeland Sec.).
14
Examining Social Media 2019 Hearing Rep. Thompson Statement, supra
note 10
15
See infra Section II.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s categorical approach
to speech under the First Amendment).
16
See infra Section II.B.
17
Facebook defines its platform as a way for people “to stay connected with
friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share and express
what matters to them,” and has had 1.59 billion daily active users on average as of June
2019. Company Info, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM, https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/
[https://perma.cc/XD7Y-E7LY]; see alsoMaryamMohsin, 10FacebookStatsEveryMarketer
Should Know in 2019, OBERLO (June 6, 2019), https://www.oberlo.com/blog/facebook-
statistics [https://perma.cc/5YH5-BDFT] (noting “Facebook is the leading social platform,
reaching 60.6% of internet users” as of 2018).
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First Amendment-protected speech, including hate speech.
18
Facebook has defined hate speech as “a direct attack on people based
on . . . protected characteristics—race, ethnicity, national origin,
religious affiliation, sexual orientation, caste, sex, gender, gender
identity, and serious disease or disability.”
19
This is speech that the
Supreme Court has repeatedly said is protected by the First
Amendment from government suppression, yet the government
through its private proxies is seemingly trying to do just that.
20
Similarly, Facebook defines “attack” as “violent or dehumanizing
speech, statements of inferiority, or calls for exclusion or
segregation.”
21
Facebook has also banned speech that, among other
things, “glorifies violence or celebrates the suffering or humiliation
of others,”
22
as well as speech it refers to as “cruel and insensitive,”
which it defines as “content that targets victims of serious physical
or emotional harm”
23
—all speech that falls within the First
Amendment’s protective sweep against government suppression.
Continued congressional pressure on large social media
companies to ban protected speech on their platforms is
essentially a demand for private companies to regulate what
Congress cannot directly ban. Filtering such pressure through
private proxies does not remove the Constitutional and normative
problems with such action. This article argues that Congress
should have a more restricted role in moderating terrorism-
related expression on social media. First, Congress lawfully can
(and should) ensure that communication platforms are not
themselves violating federal criminal law by providing material
support to terrorism. If they were, those platforms would be guilty
of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2339B by knowingly providing services in
the form of communications platforms to foreign terrorist
organizations.
24
And social media companies are not (and should
18
Facebook’s “Terms of Service” prohibit speech on Facebook that violates its
“Community Standards”; usersmayhave individual posts deleted if violative of these standards
and may even have their accounts terminated if community standards are exceeded. Terms of
Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php [https://perma.cc/8TLR-JP5K].
19
Community Standards: Hate Speech, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards/hate_speech/ [https://perma.cc/L8UE-MM2F].
20
See infra Part I
21
Community Standards: Hate Speech, supra note 19.
22
Community Standards: Violent and Graphic Content, FACEBOOK, https://www.
facebook.com/communitystandards/graphic_violence [https://perma.cc/4JVR-YPF3].
23
Community Standards: Cruel and Insensitive, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.
com/communitystandards/cruel_insensitive [https://perma.cc/7Z8P-H424].
24
See Jailing the Twitter Bird, supra note 8, at 43–44 for a discussion on how 18
U.S.C. § 2339B, the federal material support to terrorism statute, criminalizes conduct that
supports foreign terrorist groups, such as the provision of funding to terrorist groups’
humanitarian or political wings, because of the fungibility of that aid; and how this statute
would apply to social medial platforms in their provision of social media accounts to users
linked to foreign terrorist organizations.
2019] WORDS WE FEAR 43
not be) otherwise shielded from criminal liability as they are from
civil liability.
25
Second, Congress can and should attempt to
ensure that social media platforms are not conduits for third-
party criminality in the form of others committing speech crimes,
such as posting obscenity or child pornography, or language
constituting true threats, solicitation to crime, or incitement.
Instead of such appropriate measures, Congress remains
preoccupied with constitutionally-protected speech that is
tenuously linked to the radicalization of individuals to commit
acts of violence.
26
Intellectual honesty demands that elected
leaders such as Thune squarely acknowledge that the social
media speech Congress spends most of its time pressuring social
companies to regulate largely constitutes protected speech
shielded from governmental suppression and censorship.
27
That
admission would open the door to a healthy and comprehensive
dialogue regarding why such speech is afforded First Amendment
protection, and whether those reasons should have valence
regarding private platform regulation—particularly regulation
that these companies are under tremendous governmental
pressure to impose.
Constitutionally impermissible government suppression of
protected speech has historically taken the shape of regulatory and
criminal legislation that the Supreme Court eventually deemed
unconstitutional.
28
Congressional hearings lamenting the ills of
25
Social media platforms are statutorily immune from civil liability for
platform content through Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which shields
internet providers from liability for their users’ content, though with no effect on federal
criminal law. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.”).
26
Facebook claimed in a 2017 policy document that, “[a]lthough academic research
finds that the radicalization of members of groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda primarily occurs
offline, we know that the internet does play a role.” Monika Bickert & Brian Fishman,Hard
Questions: How We Counter Terrorism, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM (June 15, 2017), https://
newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/06/how-we-counter-terrorism/ [https://perma.cc/C5UX-B58H].
But see HOW RADICALIZATION TO TERRORISM OCCURS, supra note 1, at ii, 9, 14 (noting
“evidence that the internet played at least some role in individuals’ radicalization in just
under one-half of the cases” though warning that “individuals’ processes of radicalization to
terrorismmay vary by the extremist ideologies and narratives they embrace, the time periods
in which they radicalize, the groups or movements they join (or do not join, in the case of lone
wolves), and/or their individual characteristics and experiences”). See also Max Fisher &
AmandaTaub,HowEveryday SocialMediaUsers BecomeReal-WorldExtremists, N.Y.TIMES
(Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/25/world/asia/facebook-extremism.html
[https://perma.cc/T4U8-P8XT] (describing how social media algorithms may contribute to
extremist radicalization).
27
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
28
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 15–18 (1971) (overturning a conviction
because although the defendant wore clothing with obscene language, there was no
evidence he would have acted with violence and thus was protected under the First
Amendment); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)
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various strains of protected speech have not, to date, been found to
constitute unconstitutional speech regulation. Yet what is
congressional pressure through public hearings but back-door
suppression via threat of regulation of speech? Today’s sustained
congressional pressure resembles sub-rosa regulation that the First
Amendment prohibits Congress from doing more overtly through
regulation, and hence should be considered in the same light while
weighing the costs of such suppression against the benefits.
This article builds off earlier scholarship that explored the
federal material support to terrorism statute’s application to
social media platforms.
29
This article updates that work’s
recognition that social media companies’ terms of service—the
contractual provisions users agree to adhere to when signing up
for social media services regarding types of permissible speech on
these platforms—developed largely in response to governmental
pressure that involved that terrorism statute.
30
This article
argues that since the development of these original terms of
service forbidding speech linked to terrorism and hate, Congress
has specifically and regularly applied increasing pressure on
social media companies to enforce such bans on speech linked to
terrorist incidents and groups. This includes speech involving
advocacy independent from coordination with any terrorist group,
and other protected forms of speech.
31
While congressional pressure in the form of hearings and
veiled threats of criminal prosecution have never been held to
constitute the type of statutory action prompting First
Amendment constraints, such pressure is not copacetic.
32
It is
troublesome for the same reasons the First Amendment strictly
limits the government’s ability to censor: censorial pressure is
(wearing black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War is protected under the
First Amendment because it is not likely to lead to disruptive conduct and it is merely a
“silent, passive expression of opinion”); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573
(1942) (noting unprotected categories of speech, concluding that “fighting words” are
categorically exempted from First Amendment protection because these words are likely
to produce aggressive behavior).
29
See Jailing the Twitter Bird, supra note 8.
30
Id.
31
See id. at 16–17.
32
The First Amendment typically does not regulate private actors, unless they
are functioning as a quasi-state, defined as exercising “powers traditionally exclusively
reserved to the State.” Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974). Simply
because private actors “hold out and operate their private property as a forum for
expression of diverse points of view” does not mean they are transformed into “state actors
subject to the First Amendment.” Prager Univ. v. Google, No. 17-CV-06064-LHK, 2018U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 51000, at *24 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018); see also VALERIEC. BRANNON, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R45640, FREE SPEECH AND THEREGULATION OF SOCIALMEDIACONTENT
8 (2019) (noting that courts have rejected claims that social media companies are subject
to the First Amendment because they “failed to meet the joint participation, nexus, and
entwinement tests for state action”).
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often used to arbitrarily suppress disliked speech. And disliked
speech is often speech with political value, thus weakening self-
government as well as diminishing equality and liberty.
33
When
Congress evades First Amendment strictures by getting private
companies to regulate online speech that Congress cannot, it is
worth interrogating whether similar concerns are implicated as
if the government were itself doing the censoring.
34
Part I describes notable instances in which Congress and
the executive branch have exerted influence and pressure on social
media platforms regarding social media speech purportedly linked
to terrorism. Part II explores incitement as a category of speech the
SupremeCourt considers constitutionallyunprotected,
35
highlighting
its political character. It traces how the Supreme Court has
narrowed the definition of incitement by requiring causation and a
specific intent mental state; such elements are required to prevent
arbitrary government action by way of criminalizing disliked
political speech that is only speculatively linked to actual physical
harm or other illegality.
36
This article acknowledges that social media speech that
falls below the Court’s thresholds for incitement or crime-
enabling speech is at times harmful. It questions whether such
33
See generally NADINE STROSSEN, HATE: WHY WE SHOULD RESIST IT WITH
FREE SPEECH, NOT CENSORSHIP 4 (2018) (noting that viewpoint discrimination
regulations threaten the First Amendment’s core value of autonomy, “distort public
debate . . . are . . . antithetical to our democratic political system . . . [and] violate
quality principles”).
34
This article does not argue that social media platforms are subject to the First
Amendment. Instead, it argues that similar concerns are raised by social media platforms’
censorship activities as raised by government suppression because 1) the pressure to so
censor largely flows from the U.S. government who has a history of political persecution of
speech; and 2) the negative effects of speech suppression on self-government, individual
autonomy, liberty, and equality are similar to those ills directly caused by government
censorship. However, some scholars have so argued that the First Amendment should
directly apply to these platforms. See, e.g., Benjamin F. Jackson, Censorship and Freedom
of Expression in the Age of Facebook, 44 N.M. L. REV. 121, 128, 134 (2014) (proposing First
Amendment regulation to social media platforms as protection against the companies’
contractual censorship under an expansive state action doctrine).
35
The Supreme Court has identified types of speech categorically unprotected by
the First Amendment: obscenity, child pornography, incitement, threats, defamation,
speech integral to crime, and fraud. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 467–68
(2010). This Part notes how incitement is related to the “speech integral to crim[e]”
exception to the First Amendment’s ban on government speech suppression, id. at 468, and
emphasizes both the pragmatic and principled reasons behind the narrow constructions of
both incitement and speech integral to crime categories to argue that social media speech
does not differ so greatly from other types of speech to justify more capacious
interpretations of these categories.
36
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (holding
advocacy must be “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action,” and “likely
to incite or produce such action” before it can be criminalized); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2384
(requiring force as an element for federal crime of seditious conspiracy, including, inter
alia, to “conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the
United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof”).
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speech is sufficiently harmful to justify suppression, despite the
country’s preference and functional need for expressive
freedom.
37
The article concludes that words trading on and
stirring up hate and amorphous desires for violence should be
morally condemned, and that those that utter them, if political
figures, should be challenged at the ballot box. However, state
restriction of such speech, or analogous restriction at the state’s
instigation by private actors wielding power like that of states,
should be avoided, primarily due to the inextricable linkage of
such speech to political expression.
I. REGULATING THROUGHHEARINGS (AND SOME VEILED
THREATS OF PROSECUTION)
Representative Thompson’s opening salvo to the House
Committee on Homeland Security is hardly unique in its explicit
demands that social media companies do what the First
Amendment, at least as currently construed by the Supreme
Court, prevents Congress from doing directly.
38
Congress has
conducted numerous hearings
39
over the last several years
addressing harmful speech on social media and the use of these
platforms by malign actors, including those addressing separate
concerns about election interference.
40
Such hearings seemingly
37
See generally Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1321, 1321 (1992) (“[R]obust free speech systems protect speech not because it is
harmless, but despite the harm it may cause.”).
38
See Examining Social Media 2019 Hearing Rep. Thompson Statement, supra
note 10.
39
See, e.g., DHS Monitoring of Social Networking and Media: Enhancing
Intelligence Gathering and Ensuring Privacy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Counterterrorism & Intelligence, Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 1 (2012)
(statement of Rep. Patrick Meehan, Chairman, Subcomm. on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence) (“A common theme that has emerged among many of these is the groups’ use
of social media and networking to recruit, to plan, to plot attacks against the homeland or
U.S. interests abroad.”).
40
See, e.g., Sam Dean, Google CEO Sundar Pichai Says Yes to Privacy Laws, No
to Political Bias, and Maybe to China, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.latimes.
com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-google-congress-pichai-20181211-story.html [https://per
ma.cc/Y94P-TPVA]; Steve Lohr et al., Tech Hearings: Congress Unites to Take Aim at
Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/07/16/technology/big-tech-antitrust-hearing.html [https://perma.cc/57KP-ZC9G];
Richard Nieva, Facebook and Twitter Face Senate over Accusations of Tech Censorship,
CNET (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.cnet.com/news/facebook-and-twitter-face-senate-over-
accusations-of-tech-censorship/ [https://perma.cc/3ZTV-AFPX]; Mattathias Schwartz,
Watching Congress Try to Friend Mark Zuckerberg, NEW YORKER (Apr. 11, 2018), https://
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/watching-congress-try-to-friend-mark-zuckerberg
[https://perma.cc/4BM3-2T8G]; Hamza Shaban et al., Facebook, Google and Twitter
Testified on Capitol Hill. Here’s What They Said, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/10/31/facebook-google-and-twitter-
are-set-to-testify-on-capitol-hill-heres-what-to-expect/ [https://perma.cc/HL6K-JG6C];
Dustin Volz et al., Justice Department to Examine Whether Social-Media Giants Are
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represent a concerted congressional effort to persuade and
pressure these companies into suppressing speech on their
platforms—restrictions that Congress cannot explicitly and
directly require them to censor via statute. Congress cannot,
because the First Amendment protects much of the speech that
Congress wants social media companies to censor, and for very
good reason, as explained in Part II.
This congressional pressure, reinforced by threatening
comments by both representatives and Department of Justice
officials regarding social media platforms’ prosecutorial
vulnerability to the federal material support to terrorism
criminal statute, has directly resulted in concrete action by
social media companies.
41
As detailed below, these platforms
implemented company-imposed restrictions on what kind of
speech users can utter (post) on these platforms; if users violate
these restrictions, social media platforms reserve the right to
delete offending posts as well as kick offending users off their
platforms. To put this congressional concern and the resultant
speech-suppressive social media actions in context, one must go
back to at least 2015.
A. Social Media Speech and Terrorism
The link between social media platforms and terrorism,
along with privacy concerns, is one of the most concerning
dynamics stemming frommodern society’s explosive utilization of
social media communication technologies.
42
Americans, along
with the world, were shocked when the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) posted to YouTube its brutal beheading of reporter
‘Intentionally Stifling’ Some Viewpoints, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/facebooks-sandberg-and-twitters-dorsey-to-face-questions-on-capitol-hill-
about-russian-meddling-bias-1536145201 [https://perma.cc/9K2J-VPKX].
41
See Jailing the Twitter Bird, supra note 8, at 15–16 (detailing such threats).
42
See Luke Bertram, Terrorism, the Internet and Social Media Advantage, J.
FORDERADICALIZATION, Summer 2016, at 225, 225–56 (arguing that the advancement of
social media has not only provided ease to a person’s daily life, but also to terrorist groups
by allowing them to interact regardless of their physical distance); see also Cristina
Archetti, Terrorism, Communication and the Media, in TERRORISM AND POLITICAL
VIOLENCE 134, 140 (Caroline Kennedy-Pipe et al. eds., 2015) (critiquing the extant
literature as placing too great an emphasis on social media’s role as a “platform for the
spreading of radical content and extremist ideology,” while failing to make the link
between radicalization and terrorist acts); Lisa Blaker, The Islamic State’s Use of Online
Social Media, J. MIL. CYBERAFF., 2015, at 1, 3–4 (detailing the utilization of social media
by one terrorist group and the effect on American youth in particular); Robin L.
Thompson, Radicalization and the Use of Social Media, J. STRATEGIC SECURITY, 2011,
167, 168 (warning that “[t]errorists use the Internet to recruit and radicalize members
for homegrown terrorism operations”).
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James Foley in 2014.
43
That year, a noted terrorism expert found
that “Al-Qaeda, its affiliates and other terrorist organizations
have moved their online presence to YouTube, Twitter, Facebook,
Instagram, and other social media outlets.”
44
In early 2015, the
Brookings Institution concluded that “[t]he Islamic State, known
as ISIS or ISIL, has exploited social media, most notoriously
Twitter, to send its propaganda and messaging out to the world
and to draw in people vulnerable to radicalization.”
45
Because of
the vast reach and rate of diffusion (sharing of information) of
social media platforms, a consensus was seemingly reached that
these platforms provided, and continue to provide, terrorist
organizations with a superbly efficient (effective and cheap)
method to recruit, propagandize, and radicalize.
46
The U.S. government not only noted but amplified this
reported link between terrorism and social media in its battle to
find effective means to combat foreign terrorist groups and the
tactic of terrorism itself. In 2015, the FBI’s top counter-terrorism
official concluded that social media, distinct from the internet,
created a “paradigm shift” that greatly benefitted terrorist
recruiting, and thus allowed terrorist groups to pose a greater
threat to the United States.
47
To the FBI, “social media is a critical
43
See Mark Townsend & Toby Helm, Jihad in a Social Media Age: How Can
the West Win an Online War, GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/aug/23/jihad-social-media-age-west-win-online-war [https://perma.cc/UHS3-
YQ32]; see also Lee Ferran & Rym Momtaz, ISIS Trial of Terror, ABC NEWS (Feb. 23,
2015), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/fullpage/isis-trail-terror-isis-threat-us-25053190
[https://perma.cc/8BNS-9CPV] (outlining ISIS history and ideology).
44
GABRIEL WEIMANN, WILSON CTR., NEW TERRORISM AND NEW MEDIA 1
(2014), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/STIP_140501_new_terrorism_F.
pdf [https://perma.cc/G486-D2RR].
45
J.M. BERGER & JONATHON MORGAN, BROOKINGS INST., THE ISIS TWITTER
CENSUS: DEFINING AND DESCRIBING THE POPULATION OF ISIS SUPPORTERS ON TWITTER
2 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/isis_twitter_census
_berger_morgan.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQX2-SMT9].
46
See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 9 (2018), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/NSCT.pdf [https://perma.cc/DS35-2TN3]
[hereinafter NATIONALSTRATEGY FORCOUNTERTERRORISM] (“ISIS is likely to remain the
main inspiration for such attacks, particularly if the group can retain its prominence and
use social and mainstream media coverage to promote its violent message.”); WEIMANN,
supra note 44, at 3; see also Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balance
Between Public Safety and Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th
Cong. 4 (2015) [hereinafter Going Dark 2015 Joint Testimony] (“With the widespread
horizontal distribution of social media, terrorists can spot, assess, recruit, and radicalize
vulnerable individuals of all ages in the United States either to travel or to conduct a
homeland attack. As a result, foreign terrorist organizations now have direct access into
the United States like never before.”).
47
Brian Dodwell, A View from the CT Foxhole: An Interview With Michael
Steinbach, Assistant Director, FBI, CTCSENTINEL, June 2015, at 5, 5–6, https://ctc.usma.
edu/app/uploads/2015/06/CTCSentinel-Vol8Issue612.pdf [https://perma.cc/493S-FV66].
Mr. Steinbach states:
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tool that terror groups can exploit.”
48
Then-FBI Director James
Comey testified to Congress in mid-2016 that “ISIL continues to
disseminate their terrorist message to all social media users—
regardless of age,” recounting that the group “released a video, via
social media, reiterating the group’s encouragement of lone
offender attacks in Western countries, specifically advocating for
attacks” against government targets.
49
Following suit, in late 2015
a congressional hearing titled “Radicalization: Social Media and
the Rise of Terrorism” opened with a Representative lamenting the
voluminous number of what he called “pro-ISIS tweets,” concluding
that “ISIS’ use of platforms like Twitter is highly effective.
YouTube videos depicting violent acts againstWesterners are used
to incite others to take up arms and wage jihad.”
50
The U.S. government’s emphasis on reported links between
social media and violent acts of terrorism has continued unabated
since 2015, despite the private initiatives largely implemented that
year to limit terrorism-related content on such platforms. Senator
Tom Udall, during a January 2018 Senate Commerce Committee
hearing in which the three largest social media companies—
YouTube/Google, Facebook, and Twitter—testified that: “Terrorism
and social media is a challenging and, I think, pressing subject, and
I recognize that technology companies cannot solves this alone. But
they must do more, and I think that has been highlighted by the
questioning you’ve seen here today.”
51
Social media is fundamentally different than the “traditional” internet,
because even though the previous sites could be anonymous, you still had to go
to them, find the sites (some of them password-protected), and reach out,
whereas jihadi users of social media, with its horizontal distribution model,
actually reach into the United States.
Id. at 6–7.
48
ISIS Online: Countering Terrorist Radicalization and Recruitment on the
Internet and Social Media: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm.
on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs, 114th Cong. 52 (2016) (statement of Michael
Steinbach, Exec. Assistant Dir., Nat’l Sec. Branch, Fed. Bureau of Investigation). In
December 2015, FBI Director James B. Comey also stated: “Twitter works as a way to sell
books, as a way to promote movies, and it works as a way to crowdsource terrorism — to
sell murder.” Mike Isaac, Twitter Steps Up Efforts to Thwart Terrorists’ Tweets, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/06/technology/twitter-account-suspen
sions-terrorism.html [https://perma.cc/6GW8-WPKX].
49
Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, and the Challenges of “Going Dark”:
Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 114th Cong. 65 (2015) [hereinafter
Going Dark 2015 Hearing] (statement of James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of
Investigation).
50
Radicalization: Social Media and the Rise of Terrorism: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 1–
2 (2015) (statement of Rep. Ron DeSantis, Representative Chairman, Subcomm. on Nat’l
Sec. of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform).
51
Terrorism and Social Media 2018 Hearing, supra note 4, at 37 (statement of
Sen. Tom Udall).
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Senator Bill Nelson, during that same hearing,
remarked:
[T]hese platforms have created a new and stunningly effective
way for nefarious actors to attack and to harm. It’s startling that
today, a terrorist can be radicalized and trained to conduct attacks all
through social media. And then a terrorist cell can activate that
individual to conduct an attack through the internet, creating an
effective terrorist drone, in effect, controlled by social media.
So thank you to all our witnesses for being here and helping
explain this and particularly explain what you’re doing to rally to the
common defense of our people and our country, because using social
media to radicalize and influence users is not limited to extremists.
52
Much of congressional concern regarding social media’s
links to terrorism is often phrased in rather speculative ways.
During a January 2018 hearing before the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Senator John Thune’s
opening statement demonstrated the often ambiguous nature of
these concerns. Senator Thune stated that the hearing’s purpose
was “to examine what social media companies are doing to
combat terrorism, including terrorist propaganda and terrorist
recruitment efforts, online.”
53
After acknowledging the pluses of
social media communication, he emphasized two primary ways
terrorist groups use social media in harmful ways: to “radicalize
and recruit.”
54
The Senator then openly speculated that the
murderer behind the 2016 Orlando Pulse Nightclub mass
shooting in Orlando, Florida was “reportedly inspired by digital
material that was readily available on social media.”
55
The phrase “reportedly inspired” does not provide data
regarding what and how this mass murderer was allegedly
inspired by and how the supposed inspiration aids in the line-
drawing of acceptable content. Members of Congress seem to
assume that all online terrorist-related speech, as well as hate
speech, contributes to the terrorist radicalization and recruitment
process, and therefore should be banned. They do not question the
likelihood that any one person will be radicalized and commit
violence based on digesting online content.
The executive branch has likewise emphasized the
inspirational and propagandist nature of the terrorist social media
speech it fears and has not remained silent regarding its perceived
52
Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Bill Nelson).
53
Id. at 1 (statement of Sen. John Thune, Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce,
Sci. & Transp.).
54
Id.
55
Id. at 1–2.
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links. In the October 2018 “National Strategy for Counterterrorism
of the United States of America,” the President remarked that “we
will take action to limit [terrorists’] ability to recruit and radicalize
online.”
56
This policy document later explained:
[T]his strategy prioritizes a broader range of non-military capabilities,
such as our ability to prevent and intervene in terrorist recruitment,
minimize the appeal of terrorist propaganda online, and build societal
resilience to terrorism. This includes leveraging the skills and
resources of civil society and non-traditional partners to diminish
terrorists’ efforts to radicalize and recruit people in the United States.
. . . [W]e will thwart terrorists’ ability to exploit the Internet for
directing, enabling, or inspiring attacks.
57
Relevant to this article, this strategy emphasizes the need
to strengthen public-private partnerships, demanding that private
partners “take a greater role in preventing and countering
terrorism.”
58
This policy document also echoes congressional
concerns through its emphasis on the predominant role social
media plays in foreign terrorist groups’ successful radicalization
and recruitment efforts, stating that groups such as “ISIS and al-
Qa’ida have inspired people susceptible to theirmalign influence to
conduct terrorist attacks inside the United States.”
59
It adds that
ISIS, and other groups like it, will likely continue to inspire such
violent acts if it “can retain its prominence and use social and
mainstream media coverage to promote its violent message.”
60
The strategy document also states:
[W]e have not developed a prevention architecture to thwart terrorist
radicalization and recruitment. Unless we counter terrorist
radicalization and recruitment, we will be fighting a never-ending
battle against terrorism in the homeland, overseas, and online. Our
strategy, therefore, will champion and institutionalize prevention and
create a global prevention architecture with the help of civil society,
private partners, and the technology industry.
61
Critically, this executive branch policy states that the U.S.
government will:
56
NATIONAL STRATEGY FORCOUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 46. This document
later provides: “We must prevent terrorists from exploiting new technologies in today’s
dynamic information environment, and we must counter terrorists’ ability to recruit and
radicalize online and through other means.” Id. at ii.
57
Id. at 2.
58
Id. at 3, 5. The strategy also concludes that foreign terrorist groups utilize
“high-quality media products to recruit extremists in the West. Future radical Islamist
terrorists and other terrorists will continually adapt these and other tactics to their
circumstances and the technological advances of the age.” Id. at 7.
59
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
60
Id. at 9.
61
Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
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COMBAT TERRORISTS’ INFLUENCE ONLINE: We will
combat terrorist use of cyberspace as a global stage to showcase their
violent ideologies, to fundraise, and to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize
individuals to violence. In concert with our partners, we will expand
relationships with technology sector entities to empower them to
combat violent extremism online and terrorists’ abuse of their
platforms. We will continue to expose and counter the flood of terrorist
ideology online.
62
Michael McGarrity, the Assistant Director,
CounterterrorismDivision of the FBI, testified during aMay 2019
hearing before the House Homeland Security Committee, that
online inspiration and radicalization of what he called “home-
grown violent extremists” presented significant concerns.
63
[W]e . . . face significant challenges in identifying and
disrupting . . . terrorists who seek to perform terrorist attacks within
the United States. This is due, in part, to the ease of [online] self-
radicalization to violence and the corresponding lack of direct
connections between unknown radicalized violent extremists and
known terrorists or FTOs.
. . . .
Radicalization to violence of domestic terrorists is increasingly
taking place [online], where violent extremists can use social media
for the distribution of propaganda, recruitment, target selection, and
incitement to violence. Through the Internet, violent extremists
around the world have access to our local communities to target and
recruit and spread their messages of hate on a global scale, as we saw
in the recent attack in Christchurch, New Zealand. In recent years,
we increasingly have seen domestic terrorists communicating with
like-minded individuals overseas and the domestic terrorists traveling
to meet with these individuals. The increasingly global nature of the
threat has enabled violent extremists to engage other like-minded
individuals without having to join organized groups.
64
This FBI sentiment echoes the findings of a late 2018
executive branch product called the “First Responders’ Toolbox,”
jointly authored by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the FBI—a
document that attempted to connect the dots and provide a causal
link between social media imaging plus rhetoric and terrorist
62
Id. at 22.
63
Confronting the Rise of Domestic Terrorism in theHomeland: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 116th Cong. 18 (2019) (statement of Michael C. McGarrity,
Assistant Dir. for the Counterterrorism Div., Fed. Bureau of Investigations).
64
Id. at 18–19 (“[N]o FBI investigation can be opened solely on the basis of
First Amendment-protected activity. Thus, the FBI does not investigate mere association
with groups or movements. In order to predicate a domestic terrorism investigation of
an individual, the FBI must have information that the individual is perpetuating violent,
criminal actions in furtherance of an ideology.”).
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violence.
65
This document “highlights examples of official media
releases by designated foreign terrorist organizations, such as
ISIS, and unofficial media releases by auxiliary news agencies
and terrorist supporters.”
66
Specifically, its first title bullet warns:
“Violent Extremists Likely Will Continue to Use Disinformation
on Social Media Outlets to Instill Fear and Radicalize Others,”
later explaining that “[t]errorist disinformation may be used to
attract attention, harass people, drain public safety resources,
and incite others to violence.”
67
Claiming that extremist groups “often use manipulated
and fictitious images to enhance their messaging efforts,” it notes
that groups such as ISIS tend “to feature aspirational threats
using . . . quality imagery or infographics,” also noting that while
“these images may not be indicative of an ongoing plot, they
sometimes combine background images of actual US locations
with unrelated images of terrorists, weapons, terrorist symbols,
and attacks.”
68
One example of such dangerous terrorist
messaging was a December 2017 video that it claims was released
by “ISIS supporters . . . via social media during the holiday
season and included pictures of the Statue of Liberty, the Eiffel
Tower and a beheading of Santa Claus, which demonstrates
aspirational threats towards US and Western targets.”
69
Interestingly, this executive branch “Toolbox” openly
admits—unlike certain congressmen, such as Representative
Thompson in his January 2019 hearing, who claim that they are
only concerned with social media speech unprotected by the First
Amendment
70
—that the social speech media it identifies in the
document as dangerous is legal, constitutional, and protected
speech.
71
It acknowledges that, “[s]ocial mediamessaging is a legal,
65
JOINT COUNTERTERRORISM ASSESSMENT TEAM, FIRST RESPONDERS’
TOOLBOX (2018), https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/jcat/firstresponderstool
box/NCTC_DHS_FBI_First_Responders_Toolbox_-_Terrorist_Disinformation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8DWW-LK5E]. The product is self-described as “intended to promote
coordination among intergovernmental authorities and the private sector in identifying,
preventing, and responding to foreign terrorist activities in the US.” Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. Furthermore, this Toolbox directs those in law enforcement and the
public to ask themselves certain questions regarding social media “messaging” that the
reader thinks is linked to terrorism, such as: whether the speech is “attempting to
mobilize others to violence,” whether it conveys “a fictional, vague, and/or aspirational
threat”—finding that even “non-credible threats can also serve” terrorist ends—and
whether “the message express[es] acceptance of violence as a necessary means to achieve
ideological goals?” Id. (emphasis omitted).
70
See Examining Social Media 2019 Hearing Rep. Thompson Statement, supra
note 10.
71
JOINT COUNTERTERRORISM ASSESSMENT TEAM, supra note 65.
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constitutionally-protected activity and no single factor should be
considered on its own to signify terrorism, but when observed in
conjunction with violent extremist rhetoric and other cautionary
behaviors, may provide warning of mobilization to violence.”
72
B. Content Restrictions Follow Governmental Pressure:
Facebook
1. Original 2015 Shift to Content Restrictions
As outlined above, the serious concern in 2015 and since
regarding extremist groups’ use of social media platforms to
radicalize their audiences led members of Congress to explicitly
call for these platforms to better police online content,
73
while also
hinting that such companies were potentially violating federal
criminal law.
74
The latter threats of federal prosecution were not
subtle: Representative Ted Poe exclaimed during a 2015 speech
on the floor of the House of Representatives that “[f]ederal law
prohibits giving aid or helping a designated foreign terrorist
organization. These FTOs use Twitter, an American company, as
a tool and no one is stopping them . . . . Why are American
companies and the U.S. government allowing social media
platforms to be hijacked by terrorists?”
75
Members of Congress
sent letters to Twitter containing references to the federal
material support to terrorism statute
76
while simultaneously
72
Id.
73
See, e.g., Going Dark 2015 Hearing, supra note 49, at 58 (statement of Sen.
Diane Feinstein, Vice Chairman, S. Select Comm. on Intelligence) (“I believe that United
States[’] companies, including many founded and headquartered in my home State, have
an obligation to do everything they can to ensure that their products and services are
not allowed to be used to foment the evil that ISIL embodies.”); see also Eyragon Eidam,
President Calls Out Social Media’s Role in Evolution of Terrorism, GOV’T TECH. (Dec. 7,
2015), http://www.govtech.com/President-Calls-Out-Social-Medias-Role-in-Evolution-of-
Terrorism.html [https://perma.cc/63ND-NHXM].
74
See, e.g., Cristina Marcos, GOP Lawmaker: ISIS Shouldn’t Have Access to
Twitter, HILL (Feb. 24, 2015), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/233660-gop-
lawmaker-isis-shouldnt-have-access-to-twitter [https://perma.cc/6HTE-G6YT].
75
Id; see also Press Release, Rep. Brad Sherman, Poe, Sherman, Royce Engel:
Shut down Terrorists on Twitter (Mar. 12, 2015), https://sherman.house.gov/media-
center/press-releases/poe-sherman-royce-engel-shut-down-terrorists-on-twitter
[https://perma.cc/92CD-ME32].
76
See Press Release, supra note 75. The letter to Twitter CEO Dick Costolo
states:
We are concerned that designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations
(FTOs) and their supporters actively use Twitter to disseminate propaganda,
drive fundraising, and recruit new members—even posting graphic content
depicting the murder of individuals they have captured.
. . . [W]e urge Twitter to treat all terrorist activity in the same way it
treats other objectionable content.
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urging Twitter to engage in greater self-censorship: “[W]e urge
Twitter to treat all terrorist activity in the same way it treats
other objectionable content.”
77
While the U.S. government’s prosecutorial focus regarding
speech on social media has in reality been on individual users, the
government’s pressure on social media companies to police their
users’ accounts for terrorist-related activity has resulted in the
leading social media companies suppressing an ever-expanding
swath of First Amendment-protected speech on their platforms.
78
Twitter announced in early 2016 that it had suspended over
125,000 accounts since 2015 for “threatening or promoting terrorist
acts.”
79
Concomitantly Twitter stated that they “condemn the use
of Twitter to promote terrorism,” noting that it had changed its
policy so that internal review teams could have more latitude to
censor online content.
80
It should be additionally acknowledged
that increasing pressure was also brought civilly by families of
victims of terror attacks who attempted, unsuccessfully, to sue
social media platforms under civil anti-terrorism statutes; surely
Id.
77
Id. No social media platform has faced criminal prosecution in the United
States for hosting third-party terrorism-related content on their platforms, perhaps
because of intelligence reasons (and perhaps because the platforms have caved to
governmental pressure to restrict First Amendment-protected content on their
platforms). For the former proposition, see Matt Egan, Does Twitter Have a Terrorism
Problem?, FOX BUS. (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2013/10/09/
does-twitter-have-terrorism-problem.html [https://perma.cc/6VQN-2N7L] (citing U.S.
counter-terrorism officials as confirming that “[l]aw-enforcement agencies occasionally
ask social-media networks like Twitter and Facebook . . . not to delete the accounts of
known terrorists because of the potential to glean valuable intelligence”).
78
See Going Dark 2015 Joint Testimony, supra note 46, at 64–65 (statement
of James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation) (concluding that social media has
allowed the growing gap between internet communication, the law, and technology used
to lawfully intercept that communication to expand, requiring urgent responses); see also
Requiring Reporting of Online Terrorist Activity Act, S. 2372, 114th Cong. (2015).
79
Twitter Suspends 125,000 ‘Terrorism’ Accounts, BBC (Feb. 5, 2016), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-35505996 [https://perma.cc/7M5P-SX2P] (noting that
Twitter’s announcement also came at a time when “[g]overnments around the world -
including the US - have been urging social media companies to take more robust measure to
tackle online activity aimed at promoting violence”); see Kaveh Waddell, Twitter’s Account
Suspensions Are Surprisingly Effective Against ISIS, ATLANTIC (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.
theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/02/twitters-account-suspensions-are-surprisingly-
effective-against-the-islamic-state/463440/ [https://perma.cc/HP65-ZTD2].
80
Twitter Suspends 125,000 ‘Terrorism’ Accounts, supra note 79. The
Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the Department of Justice publicly
suggested that the U.S. could prosecute “propagandists” who spread terrorist messages
online for groups, such as ISIS, under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. Shane Harris, Justice
Department: We’ll Go After ISIS’s Twitter Army, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 23, 2015), http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/23/justice-department-we-ll-go-after-isis-twit
ter-army.html [https://perma.cc/N4NG-3UUX]. But see Tim Cushing, Twitter, Facebook
& Google Sued for “Material Support for Terrorism” over Paris Attacks, TECHDIRT (June
15, 2016), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160615/07235434714/twitter-facebook-
google-sued-material-support-terrorism-over-paris-attacks.shtml
[https://perma.cc/WF2A-MUYH].
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such civil litigation also helped spur the platforms’ increasingly
severe content restriction policies.
81
The new content restrictions social media companies have
imposed on their users in response to (primarily) governmental
pressure manifested themselves in changes to terms of service or
user agreements. Social media platforms require that users agree
to particular terms, including those requiring users to adhere to
policies regarding acceptable content, in order to access the
respective platform’s online services.
82
For example, Facebook’s
community standards changed in response to government
pressure in 2015, when it began prohibiting so-called dangerous
organizations from using its platform; in 2015, Facebook’s terms
of service changed to include, inter alia, that:
We don’t allow any organizations that are engaged in the following to
have a presence on Facebook: Terrorist activity, or Organized criminal
activity. We also remove content that expresses support for groups
that are involved in the violent or criminal behavior mentioned above.
81
However, congressional pressure was not applied in a vacuum. While social
media companies’ government-encouraged self-censorship accelerated in 2015 due to the
governmental pressure to limit what the government considered as supporting terrorism,
numerous civil lawsuits continue to attempt, unsuccessfully, at least in court, to hold social
media providers responsible for terrorist attack (unsuccessful in the U.S. largely due to a
federal statute that precludes civil liability in such instances). For example, U.S. victims of
Hamas terrorist attacks in Israel sued Facebook based on claims that its provision of a
communications platform to Hamas enabled the attacks; the appellate court agreed with
the district judge who found that the Communications Decency Act of 1996 precluded civil
liability for such claims. See Force v. Facebook, 93 F.3d 53, 57–59, 74–76 (2d Cir. 2019); see
also Gwen Ackerman, Facebook Accused in $1 Billion Suit of Being Hamas Tool,
BLOOMBERG TECH. (July 11, 2016, 3:40 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2016-07-11/facebook-sued-for-1b-for-alleged-hamas-use-of-medium-for-terror [https://per
ma.cc/6Q9F-QRP3] (alleging in the lawsuit, submitted to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York on July 10, 2016, that Facebook has “knowingly provided
material support and resources to Hamas,” thus making Facebook liable for the resulting
violence against five Americans in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Israel); Michael Bott,
Lawsuit: Twitter ‘Knowingly Permitted’ Terrorists to Use Social Media Network, NBC: BAY
AREA (Jan. 13, 2016, 11:26 PM), http://www.nbcbayarea.com/investigations/Lawsuit-
Twitter-Knowingly-Permitted-Terrorists-to-Use-Social-Network-365209861.html [https://
perma.cc/H3LC-W4C7] (alleging in a complaint filed on January 13, 2016, that Twitter
allows extremists to spread their ideology as well as to recruit on its platform); Chris
Dolmetsch, Facebook Isn’t Responsible as Terrorist Platform, Court Says, BLOOMBERG:
TECH. (July 31, 2019, 3:31 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-31/face
book-wins-ruling-in-suit-claiming-it-aided-hamas-attacks [https://perma.cc/UKE4-773
M] (describing Facebook’s successful defense against civil liability for terrorist acts by
Hamas based on the Communications Decency Act); David Z. Morris, Lawsuit Claims
Twitter, Facebook, Google Liable for Terrorism, FORTUNE (June 18, 2016), http://fortune.
com/2016/06/18/lawsuit-tech-giants-terrorism/ [https://perma.cc/J3X8-B3TX] (alleging in a
complaint filed by Reynaldo Gonzalez on June 14, 2016, that Facebook, Twitter, andGoogle
are liable for the Paris Attacks because those platforms provided “provision of material
support to ISIS”).
82
See Nancy S. Kim & D. A. Jeremy Telman, Internet Giants as Quasi-
Governmental Actors and the Limits of Contractual Consent, 80 MO. L. REV. 723, 747–49
(2015) (noting that such companies employ contracts to enforce and establish their own
rules, laws, and regulations—similar to the government—with regard to their users).
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Supporting or praising leaders of those same organizations, or
condoning their violent activities, is not allowed. We welcome broad
discussion and social commentary on these general subjects, but ask
that people show sensitivity towards victims of violence and
discrimination.
83
However, stated content restrictions do not work alone to
suppress speech on social media platforms; how the social media
platforms detect speech that violates its content policies is also an
extremely important part of the suppression equation. In June
2017, Facebook released a policy document titled “Hard Questions:
How We Counter Terrorism.”
84
This document details and
demonstrates how social media companies, led by Facebook’s
example and capacious purse-strings, use technology such as
artificial intelligence to identify and remove what it labels “terror
content” prior to the general user audience ever seeing said
content.
85
For example, Facebook collaborates with other social
media platforms such as YouTube and Twitter to maintain a
“shared industry database of ‘hashes’—unique digital
‘fingerprints’—for violent terrorist imagery or terrorist recruitment
videos or images.”
86
Yet, critically, Facebook did not explain what
counts as “violent terrorist imagery” nor did it provide examples of
what satisfies, or fails to satisfy, its “terrorist content” label.
In a similar non-transparent way, Facebook in the
paragraph below focuses on the technology of image matching
while failing to describe what qualifies as a “propaganda video”:
When someone tries to upload a terrorist photo or video, our systems
look for whether the image matches a known terrorism photo or video.
This means that if we previously removed a propaganda video from
ISIS, we can work to prevent other accounts from uploading the same
video to our site.
87
In contrast, Facebook stated that it employs “[l]anguage
understanding” to “experiment with using AI to understand text
83
Jailing the Twitter Bird, supra note 8, at 17–18 (quoting 2015 Facebook
Community Standards).
84
Bickert & Fishman, supra note 26 (outlining how Facebook uses technology
such as artificial intelligence to ensure that “[t]here’s no place on Facebook for terrorism,”
while also noting that “academic research finds that the radicalization of members of
groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda primarily occurs offline”). This document also outlined the
company’s use of “[c]ounterspeech,” noting that “challenging extremist narratives online is
a valuable part of the response to real world extremism. Counterspeech comes in many
forms, but at its core these are efforts to prevent people from pursuing a hate-filled, violent
life or convincing them to abandon such a life.” Id.
85
Id.
86
Partnering to Help Curb Spread of Online Terrorist Content, FACEBOOK:
NEWSROOM (Dec. 5, 2016), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/12/partnering-to-help-curb-
spread-of-online-terrorist-content/ [https://perma.cc/3CV7-MYWA].
87
Bickert & Fishman, supra note 26.
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that might be advocating for terrorism. We’re currently
experimenting with analyzing text that we’ve already removed
for praising or supporting terrorist organizations such as ISIS
and Al Qaeda so we can develop text-based signals that such
content may be terrorist propaganda.”
88
At least this example of
how Facebook removed terror content provides a glimpse into
what Facebook considers terror content: pure praise of a group
seems sufficient. But of course, the decision-making process of
what is such content is greatly complicated by context, as the
“Napalm Girl” photograph controversy demonstrated.
89
One of
Facebook’s former corporate officers, explaining the widely-
condemned removal of said photo, stated:
These decisions aren’t easy. In many cases, there’s no clear line
between an image of nudity or violence that carries global and historic
significance and one that doesn’t. Some images may be offensive in
one part of the world and acceptable in another, and even with a clear
standard, it’s hard to screen millions of posts on a case-by-case basis
every week.
Still, we can do better. In this case, we tried to strike a difficult
balance between enabling expression and protecting our community
and ended up making a mistake.
90
Transparency of social media platforms’ content removal
decisions, as well as accountability for removal or non-removal
of material continues to be a hot-button topic on Capitol Hill and
elsewhere.
91
Advocacy groups such as the Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF) increasingly sound the alarm that “in
response to calls to remove objectionable content, social media
companies and platforms have all too often censored valuable
speech.”
92
EFF has found that only a few social media platforms,
including Facebook, have a policy of “notifying users when any
content is censored and specifying the legal request or
88
Id.
89
Aarti Shahani, With ‘Napalm Girl,’ Facebook Humans (Not Algorithms)
Struggle to Be Editor, NPR (Sept. 10, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltech
considered/2016/09/10/493454256/with-napalm-girl-facebook-humans-not-algorithms-
struggle-to-be-editor [https://perma.cc/T7CB-Y7GS] (describing the controversy that
erupted after Facebook’s human editors deleted the iconic “Napalm Girl” photograph
taken during the Vietnam War and only allowed its posting after a global campaign was
launched pressuring Facebook to allow it).
90
Justin Osofsky, FACEBOOK (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.facebook.com/josofsky/
posts/10157347245570231 [https://perma.cc/YK7J-ALQ9].
91
Social Media Platforms Increase Transparency About Content Removal
Requests, but Many Keep Users in the Dark When Their Speech Is Censored, EFF Report
Shows, ELECTRONICFRONTIERFOUND. (June 12, 2019), https://www.eff.org/press/releases/
social-media-platforms-increase-transparency-about-content-removal-requests-many-
keep [https://perma.cc/R2Q6-LNC5].
92
Id.
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community guideline violation that led to the removal.”
93
Interestingly, EFF also described a Twitter-specific terrorism
exception that emphasized that terrorism is a “class of content
that is difficult to accurately identify and can include counter-
speech or documentation of war crimes.”
94
2. History Repeats Itself: More Government Pressure,
More Facebook Censorship
As of September 2019, Facebook restricts even more
speech than it did in 2015. Today Facebook also bans speech that,
among other things, “glorifies violence or celebrates the suffering
or humiliation of others,”
95
as well as speech it refers to as “cruel
and insensitive, which [Facebook] define[s] as content that
targets victims of serious physical or emotional harm.”
96
Specifically, Facebook claims that it “remove[s] terrorist content
as soon as [it] become[s] aware of it;” Facebook has also stated
that “[n]ow, more than [ninety-nine] percent of ISIS and al Qaeda
propaganda that we remove from our service is content that we
identify ourselves before anybody has flagged it for us. . . . We also
want to do our part to stop radicalization and disrupt the
recruitment process.”
97
Facebook claims that it also removes “any
content that praises or supports terrorists or their actions
whenever we become aware of it, and when we uncover evidence
of imminent harm, we promptly inform authorities.”
98
These
constitute broad content restrictions indeed, with little clarity as
to who or what Facebook thinks constitutes a terrorist, and little
consideration for free speech principles.
The 2015 cycle of governmental pressure followed by
greater social media speech suppression and censorship has
repeated itself frequently since that year. After numerous Capitol
Hill hearings and FBI statements, Facebook released a document
on November 8, 2018 titled, “Hard Questions: What Are We Doing
to Stay Ahead of Terrorists?”
99
following its release of a similar
document in June 2017.
100
The 2018 document highlighted how
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Community Standards: Violent and Graphic Content, supra note 22.
96
Community Standards: Cruel and Insensitive, supra note 23.
97
Terrorism and Social Media 2018 Hearing, supra note 4, at 4–5 (statement
of Monika Bickert, Head of Prod. Policy and Counterterrorism, Facebook).
98
Id. at 6.
99
Monika Bickert &Brian Fishman,HardQuestions:What AreWeDoing to Stay
Ahead of the Terrorists?, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM (Nov. 8, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.
com/news/2018/11/staying-ahead-of-terrorists/ [https://perma.cc/VB83-ZG2H] [hereinafter
Hard Questions 2018].
100
Bickert & Fishman, supra note 26.
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its capability to preemptively remove terror-related content—
before users even saw and reported it—had been vastly improved
by its machine-learning technology.
101
In this response to
governmental pressure, Facebook stressed howmachine-learning
has been critical “to reducing the amount of time terrorist content
reported by [its] users stays on the platform from [forty-three]
hours in Q1 2018 to [eighteen] hours in Q3 2018.”
102
It noted that
it had removed 9.4 million pieces of terror-related content,
primarily that related to ISIS and al-Qaeda.
103
In fall 2019, the similar pattern of congressional pressure
followed by seemingly enhanced Facebook content restriction of
terrorist content was again on full display.
104
A bipartisan group of
Representatives sent a letter
105
to Facebook, Twitter and YouTube
outlining concerns that nearly every one of the sixty-eight State
Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)
had some type of social media presence.
106
While the letter
mentioned the March 2019 Facebook live-streaming of the terrorist
attack that claimed the lives of fifty-one people inChristchurch,New
Zealand and acknowledged that Facebook had announced in May
2019 that itwas taking steps to prevent such streaming and improve
take-downs of such videos once loaded, the letter seemed aimed at
what the Representatives apparently considered disparate
treatment among FTOs by the big three social media platforms to
the benefit of terrorist groups Hamas and Hezbollah.
107
The same week as the congressional letter, and directly
ahead of a September 18, 2019 Senate Commerce Committee
hearing on harmful social media content,
108
Facebook announced
changes it was making to better limit terrorist-related speech as
101
Hard Questions 2018, supra note 99.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
SeeDavey Alba et al.,Facebook Expands Definition of Terrorist Organizations to
Limit Extremism, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/17/tech
nology/facebook-hate-speech-extremism.html [https://perma.cc/43KF-SSBS].
105
Press Release, Rep. Josh Gottheimer, Joint Release: Bipartisan Group
Probes for Answers on Terrorist Organizations Use of Twitter, Facebook, Youtube to
Spread Extremist Propaganda (Sept. 17, 2019), https://gottheimer.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=1446 [https://perma.cc/WW9L-X9Z8].
106
Letter from Rep. Josh Gottheimer, Rep. Tom Reed & Rep. Brian Fitzgerald
to Social Media CEOs (Sept. 17, 2019), https://gottheimer.house.gov/uploadedfiles/9.17.
19_bipartisan_letter_to_twitter_facebook_youtube_ftos_gottheimer_reed_
fitzpatrick.pdf [https://perma.cc/ETG5-RFMY].
107
Id. (highlighting that Hamas and Hezbollah are on the State Department
list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and Hezbollah’s media supporter Al Manar has
a Twitter feed and Hamas has a Twitter account).
108
See Mass Violence, Extremism, and Digital Responsibility, supra note 7.
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well as hate speech.
109
Facebook explained that not only was it
enhancing its use of artificial intelligence to identify terror and
hate content, it was also expanding its definition of terrorists:
“[W]hile our previous definition focused on acts of violence
intended to achieve a political or ideological aim, our new
definition more clearly delineates that attempts at violence,
particularly when directed toward civilians with the [sic] intent
to coerce and intimidate, also qualify.”
110
Finally, as further demonstration of the extreme
congressional pressure on major social media companies to ban
not only unprotected speech but constitutionally-protected
speech as well, is the news that the House of Representatives is
drafting legislation to “create a ‘national commission’ at the
Department of Homeland Security to study the ways that social
media can be weaponized — and the effectiveness of tech giants’
efforts to protect users from harmful content online.”
111
As the
Washington Post and this article note, such legislation is the tip
of the iceberg of the years-long effort by numerous members of
Congress to address “online hate speech, disinformation and
other harmful content online.”
112
The Post notes that Senators
during their September 2019 hearing “questioned Facebook,
Google and Twitter executives to probe whether their platforms
have become conduits for real-world violence.”
113
In his opening
statement the Chairman of the Commerce Committee, while
noting that “the First Amendment offers strong protections
against restricting certain speech . . . [, which] undeniably adds
to the complexity of our task,” also repeated the FBI’s claims
that the 2016 “Orlando shooter was reportedly radicalized by
ISIS and other jihadist propaganda through online sources.”
114
C. Content Restrictions Follow Governmental Pressure:
Twitter
Similarly, in 2015, Twitter, which had staked a greater
public position as a protector of free expression, shifted from
lauding its free speech bona fides to suppressing far greater user
content, largely, argued as my previous scholarship noted, in
109
Combating Hate and Extremism, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM (Sept. 17, 2019),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/09/combating-hate-and-extremism/
[https://perma.cc/L6VH-4Q3X]; see also Alba et al., supra note 104.
110
Combating Hate and Extremism, supra note 109.
111
Romm & Harwell, supra note 6.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Mass Violence, Extremism, and Digital Responsibility, supra note 7 (video
statement of Sen. Roger Wicker, Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp.).
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response to government pressure.
115
From 2009 through 2015,
Twitter stated in its Terms of Service that “we do not actively
monitor and will not censor user content, except in limited
circumstances described below.”
116
However, Twitter followed
Facebook’s lead in 2015 and strengthened its policies against
offensive speech by explicitly banning “excessively violent
media.”
117
That was the first time Twitter explicitly prohibited
speech that is “threatening or promoting terrorism,” as well as
banned speech “promot[ing] violence against others . . . on the
basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation,
gender, gender identity, age, or disability.”
118
It then declared, in
late 2016, that it was “applying an even more aggressive strategy
to eradicate violent extremismon its platform” byworkingwith law
enforcement, among other means.
119
As of 2019, Twitter bans threats of violence or terrorism,
as well as the glorification of violence, the promotion of terrorism,
or violent extremism.
120
For example, its 2019 “Twitter Rules and
policies” states that:
Under this policy, you can’t affiliate with and promote the illicit
activities of a terrorist organization or violent extremist group.
Examples of the types of content that violate this policy include, but
are not limited to:
• engaging in or promoting acts on behalf of a terrorist organization
or violent extremist group;
• recruiting for a terrorist organization or violent extremist group;
• providing or distributing services (e.g., financial,
media/propaganda) to further a terrorist organization’s or violent
extremist group’s stated goals; and
115
See Elizabeth Dwoskin & Tony Romm, Twitter Adds Labels for Tweets that
Break Its Rules — A Move with Potentially Stark Implications for Trump’s Account,
WASH. POST (June 27, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/27/
twitter-adds-labels-tweets-that-break-its-rules-putting-president-trump-companys-
crosshairs/ [https://perma.cc/NUU2-5JU4] (explaining that Twitter has recently
implemented a new policy where it labels tweets that violate its rules regarding hateful
conduct); see also Sarah Jeong, The History of Twitter’s Rules, VICE (Jan. 14, 2016), http://
motherboard.vice.com/read/the-history-of-twitters-rules [https://perma.cc/V3L9-6W68]
(reviewing the changes Twitter made to its content rules through 2016).
116
Jeong, supra note 115 (emphasis omitted) (quoting the 2009-2015 Twitter
rules).
117
Id. (quoting 2015 Twitter rules).
118
Id. (alterations in original).
119
Davey Alba, Twitter Says It Suspended 360,000 Suspected Terrorist Accounts in
a Year, WIRED (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/08/twitter-says-suspended-
360000-suspected-terrorist-accounts-year/ [https://perma.cc/VC53-DMVD].
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The Twitter Rules, TWITTER: HELP CTR., https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-
and-policies/twitter-rules [https://perma.cc/FS5Y-MHWZ].
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• using the insignia or symbols of terrorist organizations or violent
extremist groups to promote them.
121
As these enhanced content restrictions reflect, social
media platforms’ progressively prohibitive content rules far
exceed banning speech unprotected by the First Amendment,
instead prohibiting much protected speech.
122
Protected versus
unprotected expression is a crucial distinction to which this
article now briefly turns, after highlighting the traditionally
political essence of incitement.
II. SPEECHWE ARE AFRAIDOF: INCITEMENT
A. Basic First Amendment Landscape
This article turns now to investigate why incitement, as
a type of dangerous speech, developed into a relatively narrow
swath of expression that the government can constitutionally
punish and hence suppress.
123
This review suggests that the high
bar the Court set for governmental suppression (usually through
criminal prosecution) of such speech in large measure rests on a
recognition of the tendency of those wielding the censorial pen
121
Terrorism and Violent Extremism Policy, TWITTER: HELP CTR. (Mar. 2019),
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/violent-groups [https://perma.cc/9F4H-
E265]. It further states:
You may not threaten or promote terrorism or violent extremism.
There is no place on Twitter for terrorist organizations or violent
extremist groups and individuals who affiliate with and promote their illicit
activities. The violence that these groups engage in and/or promote jeopardizes
the physical safety and well-being of those targeted. Our assessments in this
context are informed by national and international terrorism designations. We
also assess organizations under our violent extremist group criteria.
Violent extremist groups are those that meet all of the below criteria:
• identify through their stated purpose, publications, or actions
as an extremist group;
• have engaged in, or currently engage in, violence and/or the
promotion of violence as a means to further their cause; and
• target civilians in their acts and/or promotion of violence.
Id.
122
See, e.g., Alba, supra note 119 (“Facebook has taken a hardline stance on
terrorism and removes any and all posts that carry even a trace of suspicious content.”).
123
Much of Section II.A and II.D are drawn from earlier work this author did
tracing the development of the Court’s approach to criminalization of dangerous speech
for a 2019 article on military speech crimes. See Rachel E. VanLandingham, The First
Amendment in Camouflage: Rethinking Why We Criminalize Military Speech, 80 OHIO
ST. L.J. 73 (2019).
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to use such speech suppression to persecute disliked political
speech and minorities.
124
This brief overview of the development of incitement law
furthermore suggests that the Court’s high bar for the regulation
and suppression of dangerous speech also rests on a recognition
that government control of ideas chills the vibrant type of discourse
necessary for successful liberal democratic experimentation,
125
and
that politically valuable speechwill be thrown out as the proverbial
baby with the bathwater. Even if speech suppression is conducted
by private actors—here, powerful social media giants such as
Facebook, Twitter, and Google—the suppression’s potential
chilling effect, its potential removal of valuable political speech
from the marketplace of ideas, and its potential for abuse (that
such speech suppression will be used to persecute disliked groups
and ideas) seemingly remain. Perhaps such consequences are even
greater, given the opaqueness of social media companies’ discrete
censorship decision-making process and the lack of democratic
accountability of such institutions.
Let’s begin with the “what” of the First Amendment: the
Court has stated that the “bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment . . . is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable.”
126
This is a right “designed and
intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of
public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be
voiced largely into the hands of each of us.”
127
The Court has also
explained the free speech clause as meaning that the
“government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”
128
124
See generally NADINE STROSSEN, HATE: WHY WE SHOULD RESIST IT WITH
FREE SPEECH, NOT CENSORSHIP (2018).
125
See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“[S]peech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (“[In the United States
there is] a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”).
126
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); see alsoVirginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343, 359–60 (2003) (describing circumstances when the governmentmay punish speech).
127
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); see also Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (noting the guiding First Amendment principle is that the “government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content”). The term “speech” includes verbal and written communication, as well as expressive
conduct, which is often referred to as “symbolic speech.” Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404–06.
128
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU,
535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)); see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); see also
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“[T]he First Amendment, subject only
to narrow andwell-understood exceptions, does not countenance governmental control over
the content of messages expressed by private individuals.”); Elena Kagan, Private Speech,
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Yet this absolute-sounding principle has never been
absolutely true. Our government can and should lawfully and
appropriately restrict speech through criminalization and other
means because of its harm in contexts such as threatening or
fraudulent speech.
129
While a continuum of low to high-valued
speech seems to exist,
130
the Court’s free speech schema is more
broadly, and traditionally, viewed dividing speech into two
classes: that protected by the First Amendment and that the
government can restrict, with the unprotected category
subdivided into specific unprotected categories.
131
The Court in
2010 expressly listed five categories of unprotected speech—
obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to
crime
132
—and explained that such categories have long been
viewed as comprising a “few limited areas” in which the First
Amendment permits speech restrictions based on content.
133
B. Incitement in General
What is incitement? It depends.
134
Per the Stevens Court
cited above, it is one of the categories of speech unprotected by
the First Amendment—unprotected meaning that the
government can regulate and criminalize such speech based on
Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 413, 443 (1996) (calling this a “keystone” of First Amendment doctrine).
129
SeeDavid Crump,Desecration, Is It Protected?, 46WAKEFORESTL.REV. 1021,
1023 (2011) (outlining the Court’s categorical approach to the First Amendment); see also
Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1770–71 (2004).
130
See Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV.
2166, 2170 (2015) (“Much of modern First Amendment jurisprudence is organized around
a two-tier structure that in practice has devolved into more than two tiers.”).
131
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 975
(5th ed. 2015) (“The Supreme Court has declared that some types of expression are
unprotected and may be prohibited and punished.”). Even protected speech can be
regulated given that some laws may incidentally burden speech while having legitimate,
non-speech purposes. Id.
132
The Court in United States v. Stevens listed these five categories as “historic
and traditional,” while also noting that “[m]aybe there are some categories of speech that
have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or
discussed as such in our case law. . . . We need not foreclose the future recognition of
such additional categories . . . .” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468, 472 (2010);
see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 131, at 1053–54 (noting that “fighting words” have
been considered their own unprotected category, but the Court has not upheld a fighting
words conviction since its 1942 Chaplinksy decision).
133
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468–70 (“The First Amendment’s guarantee of free
speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of
relative social costs and benefits.”).
134
Professor David A. Anderson characterizes incitement in the tort law context
as “neither a cause of action nor a defense—it is a rebuttal to a First Amendment defense.”
David A. Anderson, Incitement and Tort Law, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 957, 964 (2002).
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its content.
135
According to Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary,
“incite” is a transitive verb meaning “to move to action : stir up :
spur on: urge on.”
136
Turning to U.S. criminal law, one finds that
it contains no common law crime of incitement, while incitement
is a distinct crime in British common law,
137
from which U.S.
criminal law sprang; however, U.S. criminal law has long used
the term “solicitation” (instead of incitement) to formally label
the inchoate crime of encouraging, inducing, commanding,
counseling, etc. someone else to commit a crime, with the mental
state requirement that the speaker doing such counseling intend
that the target crime will be committed.
138
While American criminal law uses the term solicitation to
refer to the inchoate speech crime of counseling or encouraging
the commission of a criminal act, it does include a particular
construct called incitement. Broadly speaking, “incitement” in
American law generally refers to the advocacy (praising the
propriety) of illegal action or violence (violence being, of course,
usually illegal as well).
139
It becomes criminal incitement when
such advocacy is intended to cause imminent illegality and is
reasonably likely to cause the same.
140
The line between advocacy of illegal action and
encouragement of the same—the latter being criminal
solicitation even without likelihood of immediacy of harm—often
seems thin. It is seemingly maintained by the nature of the term
135
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468–69.
136
Incitement, MERRIAM-WEBSTERDICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/incitement [https://perma.cc/DMJ6-376F].
137
See generally L.M. Clements, Incitement and Impossibility - Do We Need a
Statutory Definition of Incitement?, 48 J. CRIM. L. 102 (1984) (U.K.) (describing the British
crime of incitement). Incitement is part of international criminal law as well. For the most
comprehensive and normatively-compelling analysis of modern international criminal law
speech crimes, see generally GREGORY S. GORDON, ATROCITY SPEECH LAW: FOUNDATION,
FRAGMENTATION, FRUITION (2017).
138
See JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN GARVEY, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS817 (8th ed. 2019) (describing the crime of solicitation); HerbertWechsler et al.,
The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute:
Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 621 (1961). However, there
are numerous statutory crimes called “incitement to riot” that criminalize what is
essentially solicitation to commit property damage or other violence when the target act is
imminent. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1) (criminalizing, inter alia, those who “incite a
riot”); CAL. PENALCODE § 404.6.
139
Violence is typically illegal, yet the Court used language seemingly
bifurcating illegality from the use of force, hence this article occasionally does as well.
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (forbidding the state
prohibition of “advocacy of the use of force or of law violation” unless intended and likely
to imminently produce it (emphasis added)); see generally Eugene Volokh, The Speech
Integral to Criminal Conduct Exception, 101 CORNELLL. REV. 981, 989–90 (2016) (noting
distinction between advocacy and criminal solicitation of illegal conduct, without
distinguishing illegal conduct from violent illegality).
140
See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48.
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“advocacy” as referring to more abstract, doctrinal-type praise,
versus a one-on-one, direct call to action of encouragement or
counseling.
141
The latter direct counseling or encouragement
would typically constitute solicitation, and therefore fall under
the separate speech integral to crime exception to the First
Amendment if it requests or encourages “a specific criminal act
at a specific place or time.”
142
The separate unprotected category
of incitement, and its requirement of a likelihood of imminent
harm, need not be applied.
Most specifically, incitement as a strict legal term in U.S.
law today is used to describe the act of advocating criminal
behavior through speech, with the actual criminality of said
speech—and hence whether or not it constitutes incitement—
hinging on the nexus to immediate harm.
143
The Supreme
Court’s requirement of a close temporal nexus between such
advocacy-type speech and harm is the seminal Brandenburg
case’s contribution to the First Amendment’s intersection with
criminal law, with only advocacy that is intended to, and likely
to produce, imminent illegality constituting incitement.
144
According to a leading First Amendment scholar, “[o]ne of the
most respected principles of U.S. constitutional law is that the
First Amendment does not prevent the government from
enforcing criminal laws against speech aimed at inciting or
likely to lead to an imminent harm.”
145
C. Incitement’s Domestic Political Pall
Before going further, it is important to note that the term
“incitement” is a loaded one—a term historically, as well as today,
employed in situations heavily freighted with political baggage.
146
141
See Volokh, supra note 139, at 993–95 (dissecting the fuzziness of this line
between solicitation and protected advocacy of illegal action or violence).
142
Id. at 991. The “speech integral to criminal conduct” category of unprotected
speech, which includes speech that constitutes crimes such as solicitation and conspiracy,
has a long lineage, with Justice Holmes stating in 1919 that he didn’t think the Founding
Fathers would have “ever supposed that to make criminal the counselling of a
murder . . . would be an unconstitutional interference with free speech.” Id. at 989 (quoting
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
143
SeeCHEMERINSKY, supra note 131, at 1039 (describing incitement as advocacy
illegality); see also KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, & THE USES OF LANGUAGE 206
(1989) (discussing the Supreme Court’s treatment of subversive advocacy, or speech
“intended to encourage illegal action”).
144
See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
145
Alexander Tsesis, Foreword: Terrorist Incitement on the Internet, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 367, 369 (2017).
146
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 131, at 1039–40; see also Tsesis, supra note
9, at 663 (noting the use of incitement law in U.S. history to suppress “subversive but
nonviolent speech” during the Red Scare).
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The very development of incitement as a category of speech
unprotected by the First Amendment occurred in a cauldron of
volatile politics, from opposition to World War I, to the Red Scare,
McCarthyism, racial bigotry, and anti-Semitism.
147
Before this
article overviews incitement’s ultimate development into advocacy
of illegality or violence requiring imminency of the advocated
action, it is interesting to note that incitement today often carries
similar political baggage that has freighted it in the past. Today’s
accusations of “incitement” by prominent politicians (and pundits)
against other politicians provides a strong reminder why the
Supreme Court’s narrow construction regarding when incitement
can by punished by the state is a normatively valuable one.
What is the strongest example of incitement as closely
linked to politics today? One need not look any further than the
White House. President Trump’s provocative and baiting use of
words provides a good example of the political tint that colors
modern claims of incitement. He continues to be regularly
accused of “inciting” certain behavior.
148
Claims of incitement started before Trump was elected:
During a March 2016 campaign rally, then-candidate Trump
yelled multiple times to “[g]et them out of here,” referring to
various hecklers who later sued Trump and others.
149
The
lawsuit claimed that crowd members assaulted the hecklers due
to Trump’s “incitement.”
150
The month before, candidate Trump
told a campaign crowd that “[i]f you see somebody getting ready
to throw a tomato, knock the crap out of them, would you?
147
GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES, FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 5, 12–13
(2004) (“Time and again, Americans have allowed fear and fury to get the better of them. Time
and again, Americans have suppressed dissent, imprisoned and deported dissenters . . . .”).
148
And understandably so. See Elie Mystal,Donald Trump Isn’t Playing Games
with Ilhan Omar—He’s Inciting Violence, NATION (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.
thenation.com/article/trump-inciting-violence-ilhan-omar/ [https://perma.cc/MR99-DB
ET] (describing “Trump’s established pattern of exhorting his followers to violence”).
149
Avi Selk, The Violent Rally Trump Can’t Move Past, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2017,
1:29 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/04/03/the-violent-rally-
trump-cant-move-past/ [https://perma.cc/6AAG-5MNP]. The lawsuit alleged that Trump
“incited a riot,” a misdemeanor crime under Kentucky state law that is also actionable per
Kentucky tort law. Nwanguma v. Trump, 903 F.3d 604, 607–08 (6th Cir. 2018).
150
Aaron Blake,A Judge Rules TrumpMay Have Incited Violence . . . and Trump
Again Has His Own Mouth to Blame, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2017, 9:58 AM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/04/02/a-judge-rules-trump-may-have-incited-
violence-and-trump-again-has-his-own-mouth-to-blame/ [https://perma.cc/8AWR-U9ZT];
see also Mystal, supra note 148 (describing other campaign rally events during which
Trump seemed to encourage violence against attendees). The lawsuit against Trump was
later dismissed due to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit finding that Trump’s
language did not violate the Kentucky statute at issue and was protected by the First
Amendment. Nwanguma, 903 F.3d at 613; see Josh Gerstein, Court Hands Trump Victory
in Lawsuit by Campaign Rally Protesters, POLITICO (Sept. 11, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.
politico.com/story/2018/09/11/trump-legal-victory-campaign-rally-protesters-815482
[https://perma.cc/AQ38-CWJH].
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Seriously, OK? Just knock the hell . . . I promise you I will pay
for the legal fees. I promise, I promise.”
151
At yet another
campaign rally he referred to a protestor, saying, “[g]et him
out . . . Try not to hurt him. If you do, I’ll defend you in court.
Don’t worry about it.”
152
Trump was also roundly criticized for
seemingly inciting gun violence on the campaign trail against
his opponent Secretary Hillary Clinton when he commented that
the “Second Amendment people” could possibly do something
(something seemingly violent) about Clinton’s potential ability
to nominate Supreme Court justices.
153
The accusations of incitement did not stop when Trump
took office. An April 2019 New York Times opinion piece titled
“Trump’s Anti-Abortion Incitement,” argued that the president’s
public comments regarding non-viable pregnancies would cause
violence against doctors: “Abortion providers are regular targets
of domestic terrorism, and Trump’s lies serve as incitement.”
154
The writer used the term incitement to describe the president’s
speech because the president’s words had the “potential to
inspire violence.”
155
The list goes on. In May 2019, Democratic presidential
candidate Beto O’Rourke accused President Trump of inciting
violence against Representative Ilhan Omar, an American citizen
and a Muslim.
156
Again, Trump’s social media speech was at issue;
he tweeted a video depicting the World Trade Center towers
151
Meghan Keneally, A Look Back at Trump Comments Perceived by Some as
Encouraging Violence, ABC NEWS (Oct. 19, 2018, 10:55 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/
Politics/back-trump-comments-perceived-encouraging-violence/story?id=48415766
[https://perma.cc/J23S-JHB9].
152
Id.
153
Nick Corasaniti & Maggie Haberman, Donald Trump Suggests ‘Second
Amendment People’ Could Act Against Hillary Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/10/us/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton.html
[https://perma.cc/Z2NK-PJ4F] (‘“If she gets to pick her judges, nothing you can do, folks,’
Mr. Trump said, as the crowd began to boo. He quickly added: ‘Although the Second
Amendment people — maybe there is, I don’t know.’”).
154
Michelle Goldberg, Trump’s Anti-Abortion Incitement, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/opinion/trump-wisconsin-abortion.html
[https://perma.cc/B8FT-56MA] (stating further that “thrilling self-righteousness and justified
hatred is the effect incitement is supposed to produce”).
155
Id.
156
Michael Burke, O’Rourke: Trump Inciting Violence Against Omar by
Sharing Video, HILL (Apr. 14, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/438821-
orourke-trump-inciting-violence-against-omar-by-sharing-video [https://perma.cc/2453-
HTHX]; see also Julia Conley, Trump Denounced for ‘Incitement to Violence’ Against
Ilhan Omar After Latest Racist Attack on Congresswoman, COMMON DREAMS (July 15,
2019), https://www.commondreams.org/news/2019/07/15/trump-denounced-incitement-
violence-against-ilhan-omar-after-latest-racist-attack [https://perma.cc/8FLL-4V8S]
(citing Historian Kevin Kruse) (“Trump’s racist rhetoric targeting women of color in
Congress could carry serious and dangerous consequences for the lawmakers, noting that
Omar has already been subjected to threats on her life.”).
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burning with an excerpt of Congresswoman Omar’s 2019 speech to
the Council on American-Islamic Relations.
157
O’Rourke called this
tweet “an incitement to violence against Congresswoman Omar,
against our fellow Americans who happen to be Muslim. This is
part and parcel of whatwe’ve seen from an administration that has
described Mexican immigrants as rapists and criminals . . . .”
158
The next month, Trump also faced accusations of inciting racism
toward Representative Omar and three of her colleagues, first by
posting tweets that “urged her and three other nonwhite freshman
congresswomen to return to their countries to fix their ineffective
governments,”
159
and then by prompting a crowd at a rally to
express the same – through chants of “send her back” in an
apparent reference to deport all four American congresswomen.
160
President Trump is not the only American politician
accused of incitement in 2019. In a strange twist, two of the
Congresswomen President Trump was accused of inciting
harmful action against were themselves accused of incitement,
albeit by a foreign politician. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu called U.S. Congresswomen Omar and Rashida Tlaib
(the first Muslim women elected to Congress), who were seeking
to travel to Israel in late summer 2019, “leading activists in
promoting the legislation of boycotts against Israel in the
American Congress. The itinerary of the two congresswomen
reveals that their sole purpose is to harm Israel and increase
incitement against it.”
161
157
Burke, supra note 156 (referencing the video that depicted the part of Omar’s
speech where she said “‘some people did something’ and Muslims ‘were starting to lose
access to our civil liberties.’”).
158
Id.
159
Aaron Blake, Trump’s Incitement on Ilhan Omar Marries Two of His
Nastiest Tactics, with Familiar Results, WASH. POST (July 18, 2019), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/18/send-her-back-trumps-incitement-ilhan-omar/
[https://perma.cc/HGS9-AFPV] (claiming that President Trump knowingly caused a
crowd to disturbingly chant “send her back,” referring to the deportation of a Muslim-
American congresswoman originally from Somalia).
160
Jeff Mason, ‘Lock Her Up!’ But No ‘Send her Back!’ Chant at Trump Rally in
Ohio, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump/lock-her-
up-but-no-send-her-back-chant-at-trump-rally-in-ohio-idUSKCN1US02V [https://perma
.cc/TB7F-C3WS]. Such a phrase carries with it reverberations of Nazi incantations
against German Jews. See Chemi Shalev, Trump’s ‘Go Home’ Invective Echoes Nazi
Incitement Against Jews, HAARETZ (July 17, 2019) (Isr.), https://www.haaretz.com/us-
news/.premium-trump-s-go-home-invective-echoes-nazi-incitement-against-jews-
1.7536063 [https://perma.cc/RFP9-L8YB].
161
Raf Sanchez & Harriet Alexander, Netanyahu Bars Democrat Congresswomen
Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib from Entering Israel, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 15, 2019) (internal
quotation marks omitted), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/08/15/netanyahu-bars-
democrat-congresswomen-ilhan-omar-rashida-tlaib/ [https://perma.cc/J744-8WYL].
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D. Why We Care That We Have Brandenburg
Yet President Trump’s above-described rhetoric fails to
fall into a category of speech that could be criminally punished.
It fails to clear the high hurdle the Brandenburg court set for
what constitutes incitement as speech that can be criminally
punished. The propaganda and radicalization types of speech
that Congress has found helps recruit future terrorists and
inspire terrorist acts, and that Congress has pressured social
media companies into censoring, likewise fail Brandenburg.
Why? Because the feared harm regarding Trump’s speech is not
clearly imminent, and the speaker’s intent is not clear either;
the feared harm in the social media propaganda and
inspirational speech Congress rails against likewise lacks a
reasonable likelihood of imminent harm.
162
Simply because the 2016 Orlando Pulse nightclub shooter
was inspired (assuming the government claims are true) by speech
he viewed on social media does not transform all such inspirational
social media speech—such as that praising earlier acts of terrorism
and/or encouraging the random public to engage in similar type
acts—into speech that will usually lead others to commit eventual
violence. Causation, a critical element of American criminal law for
a reason, is not met by most such speech. And, critically, both
instances—terror propaganda and President Trump’s rhetoric—
involve speech with political value, as uncomfortable as that
accurate label feels. Praising terrorist acts, glorifying them, and
generally advocating for their propriety often demonstrates
support for the ideological goals of the terrorist or their group. And,
of course, President Trump’s comments are political given the
context in which they were uttered. Hence, if causation is not met
because of the lack of imminent harm, why is the speech being
punished? Is it being punished for its disliked content——content
that may contain political value?
Interestingly, the Trump Administration’s failure to more
clearly condemn the August 2019 El Paso shooting—a shooting
based on racial animus, according to a manifesto the shooter
posted online—demonstrates the essentially political nature of
162
The future harm from speech glorifying acts of terrorism, for example, is quite
speculative. Ben Wizner from the ACLU recently captured the issue when he stated, with
regard to deleting speech linked to future acts of terror, that “[t]he problem with that is we
don’t yet have the tech to determine pre-crime,Minority Report notwithstanding. We need
to understand that even if all mass shooters have said X, the vast majority of people who
have said X don’t become mass shooters.” Rani Molla, TrumpWants Social Media to Detect
Mass Shooters Before They Commit Crimes, VOX: RECODE (Aug. 5, 2019, 5:30 PM),
https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/8/5/20754790/trump-social-media-detect-shooter-crime
[https://perma.cc/QG7M-4JYV].
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pre-incitement speech: that is, speech that propagandizes,
inspires, and radicalizes but is not likely to result in imminent
violence. Regarding the shooting and its purported motivation, a
DHS official, frustrated that the Trump Administration refused
to condemn the murders as terrorism, stated:
This is a clear manifestation of the political discourse that has
taken place in the country over the past two years or so . . . . It cannot
be blamed on mental health. This is an ideology-driven hate crime.
This is terrorism and the White House has trouble labeling it as
such.
163
Pre-incitement speech, even if linked to later acts of violence, is often
political, and hence at the core of First Amendment protection.
The reasons why Brandenburg exists should give us
pause when speech that is protected from governmental
suppression is restricted by proxy. The Supreme Court’s
holdings prior to Brandenburg allowed great swaths of disliked
political speech to be suppressed. Those holdings also permitted
criminal law to be used against disliked groups, such as
anarchists and Communists.
164
And speech suppression by social
media platforms risks doing something similar.
The Brandenburg court found that that the First
Amendment only allows “a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation . . . where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.”
165
Brandenburg’s strict
imminency and intent requirements were instituted for a reason:
to safeguard against government suppression of disliked speech,
and disliked people. They represent the culmination of the Court’s
experimentation with earlier, elastic formulations as to what
constitutes dangerous speech that could be criminalized without
violating the First Amendment. These earlier formulations gave,
time and time again, the government and states huge leeway to
punish and hence suppress disliked speech, using the excuse that
such speech was potentially dangerous.
166
It is worth briefly
reviewing the criminal law aspects undergirding the final and
current Brandenburg incitement recipe in order to appreciate that
when speech that fails to meet its intent and imminency prongs
can be or is suppressed—by private social media companies
163
BetsyWoodruff,DHSOfficial: Trump Can’t Admit ‘This Is Terrorism,’DAILY
BEAST (Aug. 6, 2019, 1:27 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/dhs-official-on-el-paso-
and-dayton-trump-cant-admit-this-is-terrorism [https://perma.cc/4824-C3E8].
164
See STONE, supra note 147, at 5, 12–13.
165
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
166
See generally STONE, supra note 147, at 549 (detailing the cyclical nature of
such suppression in U.S. history).
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pressured by the government into restricting such speech online—
the same vulnerabilities exist to suppress speech with political
salience and only speculative, third or fourth-order harm.
167
E. Why Brandenburg? Earlier Approaches Allowed
Persecution of Politically Valuable Speech That Was
Only Speculatively Harmful
Prior to early twentieth centuryEspionage andSeditionActs
prosecutions and the resultant development of the Supreme Court’s
First Amendment jurisprudence, the federal courts utilized what is
called the “bad tendency” test, to evaluate claims that speech the
government deemed harmful was being unconstitutionally
punished.
168
If the speech had a bad tendency (arbitrarily decided by
the courts) to produce harm, it could be constitutionally suppressed
without running afoul of the First Amendment.
The bad tendency test, borrowed from common law
attempt crime jurisprudence, had two prongs: a specific intent to
commit a crime and an act sufficient to show that the criminal
result of whatever the target crime (that charged as being
attempted) was the natural outcome.
169
Translated to speech
cases, attempt law’s acts became speculative and remote
tendencies of harm (stretching the already ambiguous attempt
law natural outcome), meaning that the feared resultant harm of
the speech may be and often was highly doubtful.
170
In other
words, the causal link between supposedly harmful speech and
the feared harm was tenuous at best or practically non-existent.
Furthermore, the requisite specific intent (to commit the target
crime) inferentially merged with that same tendency. As a result,
the test collapsed into a judicial guess as to whether the speech at
167
Section II.E draws frommy article onmilitary speech crimes in which I trace
the evolution of the Court’s approach to dangerous speech. See VanLandingham, supra
note 123, at 73.
168
DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 2 (1997); see also
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 463 (1907) (upholding newspaper journalist’s
contempt conviction for articles and cartoons criticizing judges in a pending case,
explaining that the First Amendment did not prohibit criminal punishment of speech
already uttered based on its tendency to cause harm because “if a court regards, as it may,
a publication concerning a matter of law pending before it, as tending toward such an
interference, it may punish it as in the instance put” (emphasis added)); STONE, supra note
147, at 171–73 (explaining the embrace of the bad tendency test by federal courts to uphold
Espionage Act convictions during World War I).
169
See David R. Dow & R. Schott Shieldes, Rethinking the Clear and Present
Danger Test, 73 IND. L.J. 1217, 1222–23 (1998); STONE, supra note 147, at 174–76 (noting
how the courts skirted common law attempt’s specific intent requirement by allowing
“constructive intent”).
170
See generally STONE, supra note 147, at 179, 215 (detailing how bad tendency
applied to speech truncated attempt law’s requirement of proximity of harm).
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issue could potentially—speculatively—cause the particular
harm the statute at issue was trying to prevent. And in times of
great public national security fear, such as pre-World War I
paranoia of anarchists, McCarthyism, and the like, it was
relatively easy for courts to find tendency of harm, thus intent,
and thus criminal speech.
171
To demonstrate how pre-incitement speech was
criminalized prior to Brandenburg, and hence why the Supreme
Court set Brandenburg’s high standard, it is helpful to review
several famous First Amendment cases. In the World War I era,
the federal courts applied the collapsed “bad tendency” test to
Espionage Act convictions by requiring proof that the defendant
both possessed a non-express criminal intent and their language
had “a natural and reasonably probable tendency” to cause
unlawful harm.
172
For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Shaffer v. United States upheld an Espionage Act conviction for
mailing a book critical of the war by asking “whether the natural
and probable tendency and effect of the words . . . are such as are
calculated to produce the result condemned by statute.”
173
While
the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that disapproval of the war was
not criminal, the court reasoned that criticizing the war could
weaken patriotism and the desire to serve in the military, so
criminalizing the publication of a book critical of the war
shockingly posed no constitutional issues.
174
Furthermore, courts of that era employed no temporal or
other limitation to determine tendency of harm—the likelihood of
speech leading to a criminal outcome. Instead courts simply rubber-
stamped convictions involving speculative and remote harm,
171
Id. at 191–95.
172
Brief for the United States at 77, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919)
(No. 714). Espionage Act convictions required proof both that the defendant possessed a
“specific, willful, criminal intent” and that his language had “a natural and reasonably
probable tendency” to cause unlawful harm. Id.
173
Shaffer v. United States, 255 F. 886, 887–88 (9th Cir. 1919) (upholding
conviction for mailing a book containing several “treasonable, disloyal and seditious
utterances,” explaining that “[t]o teach that patriotism is murder and the spirit of the
devil, and that war against Germany was wrong and its prosecution a crime, is to weaken
patriotism and the purpose to enlist or to render military service in the war”); see also
Goldstein v. United States, 258 F. 908, 910 (9th Cir. 1919) (explaining that in certain
circumstances a piece of writing or a “picture to the public” may “be calculated to foment
disloyalty or insubordination”); Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 38 (2d Cir. 1917)
(“If the natural and reasonable effect of what is said is to encourage resistance to a law,
and the words are used in an endeavor to persuade to resistance, it is immaterial that
the duty to resist is not mentioned, or the interest of the persons addressed in resistance
is not suggested.”).
174
Shaffer, 255 F. at 887.
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convictions—based on war hysteria and bias.
175
The lack of a
temporal requirement—such as Brandenburg’s imminency
requirement—was of course linked to causation; if the feared
resultant harm did not have to be reasonably imminent, it was
easier to criminalize speech that would likely never cause any harm;
the causal link was essentially buried. And once a speculative harm
was established, the requisite intent was then easy to find by using
the natural and probable consequences presumption, one that
allowed juries to presume that defendants intended the natural and
probable consequences of their actions, instead of requiring the
government to prove intent to commit the crime at issue.
176
This
presumption conflated attempt law’s two prongs, hence ensuring
convictions once speech’s tendency to harm was established. And
since a tendency to harmhadno temporal or remoteness limitations,
speakers could be punished for unrealized third-party action that
could possibly (speculatively) be caused by their speech.
177
1. Bad Tendency Dressed as Clear and Present Danger
In 1919, the Supreme Court in United States v. Schenck,
the Court’s first and most famous Espionage Act case,
uncritically adopted the bad tendency approach to determine
whether speech was sufficiently harmful as to allow its
constitutional criminalization.
178
Justice Holmes’s “clear and
present danger” test to determine whether speech can be
criminalized consistent with the First Amendment was the bad
tendency test dressed up in a fun metaphor. In upholding
petitioners’ convictions for conspiracy to distribute pamphlets
175
The Shaffer rationale highlights the speculation necessary to meet the bad
tendency test; in concluding that unpatriotic speech has a tendency to harm the draft or
troop loyalty, it found that:
Printed matter may tend to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service,
even if it contains no mention of recruiting or enlistment, and no reference to
the military service of the United States.
. . . To teach that patriotism is murder . . . and that the war against
Germany was wrong and its prosecution a crime, is to weaken patriotism and
the purpose to enlist or to render military service in the war.
Id. at 888.
176
Dow & Shieldes, supra note 169, at 1222. The speaker “must be presumed
to have intended the natural and probable consequences of what he knowingly did.”
Shaffer, 255 F. at 889. This presumption drew upon common law “natural and probable
consequences” doctrine. See Dow & Shieldes, supra note 169, at 1222–23.
177
See Dow and Shieldes, supra note 169, at 1222–23 (noting that the bad
tendency approach treated speech as an act, and evaluating speech effects was simply a
matter of asking “whether it was reasonable to assume that certain ill effects would
follow”); see also STONE, supra note 147, at 215 (“[F]ederal courts routinely conflated
these two elements and allowed juries to infer criminal intent from bad tendency.”).
178
See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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“calculated to cause . . . insubordination” in the military and
obstruction of the draft,
179
Holmes allowed the inference of the
requisite intent to cause insubordination and obstruction. He
speculated that the petitioners’ pamphlet might influence men
subject to the draft to refuse their order; since that was a
possible effect, the defendants must have intended that possible
effect—that effect was contradicted by the fact that the
supposedly-criminal pamphlet expressly called only for lawful
draft repeal.
180
Schenck included Holmes’s famous false cry of fire
metaphor, ostensibly laying out a “clear and present danger”
approach that could have, if applied seriously, narrowed the bad
tendency test to speech that caused not merely speculative harm,
but likely harm in the near-term.
181
Yet the Schenck court made
the illogical leap that like a panic-inducing false cry of fire in a
crowded theater would not be protected by the First Amendment,
the defendants’ pamphlet was likewise not protected,
demonstrating that clear and present danger was merely the bad
tendency test by another name.
182
Soon after Schenck, Justice Holmes again wrote for a
unanimous Court in Frohwerk v. United States and Debs v.
United States, summarily upholding these Espionage Act
convictions for dissenting speech.
183
In Frohwerk, the defendant’s
179
Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48–50 . Charles T. Schenck, the secretary general of the
Socialist Party, and Elizabeth Baer were convicted of three counts of violating the
Espionage Act in that they “willfully conspired to have printed and circulated to
men . . . called . . . for military service . . . a document set forth and alleged to be calculated
to . . . cause . . . insubordination and obstruction” and for conspiracy to mail, and actually
mailing, the same. Id.
180
Id. at 51 (“[T]he document would not have been sent unless it had been
intended to have some effect, and we do not see what effect it could be expected to have
upon persons subject to the draft except to influence them to obstruct the carrying of it
out.”); see also STONE, supra note 147, at 192–93 (highlighting the irrationality of this logic).
181
See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. The Court stated:
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. . . . The question in every case
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree.
Id.
182
See STONE, supra note 147, at 194–95 (discussing the lack of danger in
Schenck, and pointing out the fallacy even if there was such a danger, given that there
may be value to speech that outweighs any danger created); Dow & Shieldes, supra note
169, at 1222–23 (describing the bad tendency test) (“If the act of speech will tend to cause
ill effects, then the speech is subject to punishment. . . . [I]n measuring the potential ill
effects of certain speech, the proper test was to ask simply was it was reasonable to
assume that certain ill effects would follow.”).
183
See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (“[T]he First
Amendment while prohibiting legislation against free speech as such cannot have been,
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conviction for conspiracy and attempt to cause “disloyalty, mutiny
and refusal of duty in the military and naval forces” was based
merely on newspaper articles protesting the draft and the war.
184
In Debs, the Socialist Party’s candidate’s conviction for inciting
“insubordination, disloyalty, and mutiny and refusal of duty in
the military” as well as for recruitment and enlistment
obstruction were based on a public speech in which he paid
homage to three jailed war opponents.
185
The speech at issue in
both cases, primarily about the virtues of socialism, were merely
anti-war, again highlighting how when specific intent that speech
will bring about imminent illegality as a material element of a
crime is not vigorously required, nor is likelihood of imminent
harm, even if such harm is clearly intended, it is easy for
suppression of disliked political speech to occur.
186
2. Brandenburg: Robust Clear and Present Danger
Justice Holmes tried to give his clear and present danger
test teeth, but it took fifty more years for the Supreme Court to
fully place the clear and present danger approach on its present
Brandenburg footing.
187
The Court’s march from Schenk to
Brandenburg is well-worn, and highlights the susceptibility of
national security speech crimes—speech made criminal because
of a feared negative impact on national security—to enormous
governmental overreach through prosecution of speech based on
fear, dislike, and paranoia instead of real harm. The path to
Brandenburg also reveals how the criminal law concepts of the
mental state of intent and the separate element of causation
(causation as operationalized through imminence of likely harm
resulting from the speech requirement) can help ensure an
appropriate balance between expressive freedom and freedom
from harm.
and obviously was not, intended to give immunity for every possible use of language.”);
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919). The Debs Court continued the lower
courts’ habit of ostensibly requiring specific intent, while allowing the jury to infer intent
from tendency: “[I]f in that speech he used words tending to obstruct the recruiting
service he meant that they should have that effect.” Id.
184
Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 205. Given the derogatory nature in which appellant’s
articles portrayed the U.S. war efforts, and despite an acknowledgement there was no
special attempt to reach draft-age men, the Court upheld the convictions based on the
mere possibility that the articles could negatively affect the military. Id. at 209–10.
185
Debs, 249 U.S. at 212.
186
See STONE, supra note 147, at 208 (“[T]he ‘bad tendency’ test . . . enables the
government to eliminate almost all criticism.”).
187
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (finding that the
First Amendment does not “permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”).
78 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:1
This article will not have space to retread all that ground,
but it will highlight the famous dissent in Abrams v. United
States that set the stage for clear and present danger’s eventual
Brandenburg definition.
188
Five defendants in Abrams were
convicted for tossing two leaflets out of New York City windows
denouncing U.S. troops in Russia and urging stoppage of
weapons productions and were sentenced to twenty years for
violating the Espionage Act.
189
Justice Holmes, joined in dissent
by Justice Brandeis, revisited Schenk’s clear and present danger
metaphor to find that the defendants’ pamphlets were
constitutionally-protected speech. He argued that, unlike the
bad tendency version of his test, the government needed to prove
actual intent to cause the anticipated harm, and not simply
allow an inference of intent from a reasonable tendency to
produce such harm.
190
Additionally, Holmes required imminency
of the clear and present danger: “[i]t is only the present danger
of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants
Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion.”
191
The Supreme Court after World War I upheld the
constitutionality of state criminal anarchy and syndicalism
statutes laws, and by doing so, slowly began to modify the bad
tendency approach that was being called the clear and present
danger test.
192
It first strengthened the approach by acknowledging
that anarchy laws only criminalized the express advocacy of
illegality, hinting that the advocacy of lawful opposition and
change, such as that penalized in the Espionage Act cases, would
be constitutionally protected.
193
188
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
189
STONE, supra note 147, at 205. The pamphlets ridiculed President Wilson;
decried capitalism as the enemy; urged the “Workers of theWorld” to wake up; and warned
munitions workers that “you are producing bullets . . . to murder not only the Germans,
but also your dearest, best, who are in Russia.” Abrams, 250 U.S. at 620, 625–26.
190
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627–29 (Holmes, J., dissenting). He also highlighted
that “the principle of the right to free speech is always the same” whether in war or
peace, though “war opens dangers that do not exist at other times.” Id. at 628.
191
Id. at 627–28 (noting that the government can “punish speech that produces
or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith
certain substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent”
(emphasis added)); see also Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482 (1920) (Brandeis
J., dissenting); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 255 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
192
See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664–65 (1925) (upholding conviction
under New York anarchy statute for publications advocating strikes to bring about the end of
the state). TheGitlowCourt reasoned that the statutemay be appropriately applied to specific
speech “if its natural tendency and probable effect was to bring about the substantive evil
which the legislative body might prevent,” and that since New York had already decided that
advocacy prohibited by its statute would tend to have bad effects, no further inquiry, such as
a clear and present danger test, was necessary. Id. at 671.
193
See id. at 664–65 (“[The statute] does not restrain the advocacy of changes
in the form of government by constitutional and lawful means. What it prohibits is
language advocating, advising or teaching the overthrow of organized government by
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Justices Holmes and Brandeis disagreed, arguing that even
if such advocacy is express, the resulting danger must also be
imminent before criminality attaches.
194
Justice Brandeis’s famous
concurrence in Whitney v. California echoed Holmes’s dissent in
Abrams by stressing the need for an imminency requirement:
[T]he incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may
befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time
to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence.
195
This Holmes-Brandeis clear and immediate danger
approach gained steam in the years preceding World War II, with
the Court largely sustaining First Amendment challenges to
convictions because of lack of express intent and immediate
danger.
196
By 1942, the bad tendency test was replaced, in large
measure, by the Gitlow/Whitney Holmes-Brandeis clear and
present danger standard for determining when speech could be
criminally suppressed.
197
Cases including Herndon v. Lowry as
well as Bridges v. California indicate that the bad tendency
approach was gone, and seriousness of the harm was added:
“What finally emerges from the ‘clear and present danger’ cases
is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely
unlawful means.”). For the discussion that this acknowledgment of express advocacy
resembles Judge Learned Hand’s famous approach in Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244
F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), an Espionage Act case in which, as trial judge, Judge Hand found
the speech at issue protected because it did not expressly advocate criminal conduct, see
STONE, supra note 147, at 237.
194
Noting that there was no imminent danger of a violent government overthrow in
Gitlow, Justice Holmes famously exclaimed that, “[e]very idea is an incitement . . . . Eloquence
may set fire to reason,” and hence the dividing line for the First Amendmentmust be imminent
danger.Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
195
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(upholding a state syndicalism conviction for the formation of a local chapter of the national
communist party), overruled in part byBrandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
196
See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940) (finding that speech can only be restricted when there
is “a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State”); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 105–06 (1940); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); West Virginia Bd. Of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947) (in
overturning a contempt conviction stating that “[t]he danger must not be remote or even
probable; it must immediately imperil”).
197
See STONE, supra note 147, at 269, 396 (“In the years between 1920 and
1950 . . . the Court had increasingly moved toward the Holmes-Brandeis ‘clear and present’
danger test.”); id. at 272 (highlighting in 1942) (“[C]riminal prosecutions for expression of
the sort that were commonplace duringWorldWar I were now of doubtful constitutionality,
if not downright unthinkable. . . . [T]he prosecutions in Schenck, Frohwerk, Debs, and
Abrams were no longer thought consonant with the [C]onstitution.”).
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serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before
utterances can be punished.”
198
But there was a quick detour back to allowing the
criminalization of speculatively harmful speech during the Cold
War. In 1951, the Supreme Court temporarily jettisoned its
requirement for immediate danger in a decision upholding
charges of conspiracy to advocate for the forceful overthrow of
the government under the anti-communism 1940 Smith Act.
199
The Dennis plurality adopted the appellate court’s weakened
version of the clear and present danger test first crafted by
Judge Learned Hand: “In each case [courts] must ask whether
the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger.”
200
This new approach worked as a sliding scale, one
subject to “ideological manipulation” that seemed to try to
balance the value of the First Amendment against an unclear
“danger to society.”
201
Under this new test for harmful speech,
“threat of a great evil, even of a non-imminent one, would justify
suppression of speech.”
202
This approach seems to be the
approach to propaganda, recruitment, and radicalization pre-
incitement type speech social media platforms have been
pressured into censoring. As long as the great evil—a terrorist
act—could possibly be aided by the speech, the social media
platforms have decided (thanks to years of sustained pressure
from the U.S. government) to ban it.
Simply put, the McCarthy-era Dennis detour lacked the
Brandeis-Holmes emphasis on both immediate and substantive
198
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941) (overturning a contempt
conviction); see Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263–64 (1937) (overturning conviction
under a state anti-insurrection statute that “amounts merely to a dragnet which may
enmesh anyone who agitates for a change of government if a jury can be persuaded that he
ought to have foreseen his words would have some effect in the future conduct of others”).
199
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497 (1951). The Smith Act, passed in
1940, was another sedition act; it required resident aliens to register with the federal
government and prohibited persons “knowingly or willfully” to “advocate, abet, advise or
teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any
government in the United States by force or violence.” Id. at 496.
200
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Dennis, 183 F.2d. 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)).
201
STONE, supra note 147, at 409; see Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful
Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CALIF. L.
REV. 1159, 1171, 1173 (1982) (noting that the Dennis version of clear and present danger
was a “dramatic alteration in the test’s scope” and referring to the Dennis Court’s adoption
of “Hand[’s] sliding-scale test”); see also Redish, supra, at 1171 n.60 (“[T]he Hand-Vinson
formula . . . seems to emasculate the clear and present danger test.”(quoting T. EMERSON,
THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OFEXPRESSION 114 (1970))).
202
Redish, supra note 201, at 1172, 1180 (highlighting that “[u]ltimately, however,
theDennisCourt’s test effectively deleted the requirements that the danger be either clear or
present when the potential harm was severe”).
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seriousness of harm; by deleting the requirement for a tight
temporal connection between speech and harm—that is to
demonstrate likelihood of causation, the speech at issue likely
would cause the feared harms—the Court welcomed and
condoned speech suppression based on dislike of message.
203
While no prediction of future harm is infallible, the requirement
of immediacy of the harm improves predictive odds of causation,
plus helps indicate that it is actually the danger likely to be
caused by the speech that is animating the government (or social
media) suppression, and not simply dislike of the ideas expressed
in that speech.
Fortunately, the Brandenburg Court in 1969 corrected its
McCarthy-era deviation.
204
While the Brandenburg opinion does
not use clear and present danger language, the Holmes-Brandeis
pre-Dennis formulation of clear and present danger, one that
emphasizes immediacy and specific intent, is its core.
205
Though
Brandenburg itself did not answer the question of how to assess
imminence and likelihood of the harm, later incitement cases
have all required express advocacy of immediate violation of the
law and a high likelihood of such action, employing the Court’s
Brandenburg incitement test to consistently invalidate
convictions for mere advocacy.
206
203
See STONE, supra note 147, at 409. Instead of clear and present danger, the
Court was back to the bad tendency approach. See Redish, supra note 201, at 1173 n.71
(“Dennis ‘is simply the remote bad tendency test dressed up in modem style.’” (quoting M.
SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREMECOURT AND JUDICIALREVIEW 65 (1966))).
204
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that
“constitutional guarantees . . . do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”); see,
e.g., See STONE, supra note 147, at 522 (noting that Brandenburg “finally and
unambiguously embraced the Holmes-Brandeis version of clear and present danger”).
205
See David A. Strauss, Freedom of Speech and the Common-Law
Constitution, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THEMODERN ERA 32, 57 (Lee C.
Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (noting that “the Court’s emphasis on
imminence and on a high probability of harm” flows directly from Homes-Brandeis clear
and present danger approach).
206
See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 459 U.S. 886, 902 (1982)
(overturning civil judgment against the NAACP for boycott of white-owned businesses
based in part on the statement: “If we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores,
we’re gonna break your damn neck.”); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969)
(reversing conviction of man who publicly said “if they ever make me carry a rifle the
first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.”); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973)
(per curiam) (reversing conviction for shouting “[w]e’ll take the fucking street later” at
an antiwar demonstration); see also Dow & Shieldes, supra note 169, at 1233–34 (noting
use of Brandenburg test to invalidate convictions for advocacy of violence).
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CONCLUSION
This article highlights that most of the high-visibility
congressional and executive branch concern shown in the area of
terror-related speech on social media has been and remains
largely directed at constitutionally protected speech. The targeted
radicalization, recruitment and propaganda-type speech can
undoubtedly, and tragically, help inspire a few of the over three
billion individuals on social media to join terrorist groups and/or
commit acts of violence. While Congress and the executive branch
emphasize this very slight chance of harm that could result from
such speech, they fail to equally emphasize that the largemajority
of it remains outside their constitutional purview to regulate, yet
they try to do so regardless—successfully. This article
demonstrates that much of the terror content speech restrictions
currently employed by the leading social media platforms have
resulted from congressional pressure to enact such restrictions—
restrictions that Congress itself could not enact due to the
protections the First Amendment lends to much of this speech.
This is problematic because congressional leaders have
failed to engage with the reasons why the Constitution prohibits
them from regulating such speech: because the slight and
remote potential that such offensive and vile speech will cause
harm is far outweighed by its potential political value. Also, the
Constitution prohibits regulation of such admittedly repulsive
speech because speech with such slight causal connection to
violence or other illegality is prone to censorship because of its
disliked ideas or disliked speakers, instead of because of any
strong connection to eventual violence or other illegality. These
realities are conveniently ignored today by both government
officials and private actors involved in policing social media
speech in their efforts to appear effective against terrorism.
Instead of trying to censor pre-incitement speech, they should be
focusing on the root causes behind the formation and continued
existence of such extremist groups and their violent crimes.
Seemingly defending social media speech that glorifies
violence, terrorist acts, and/or that glorifies extremist groups
that cater in misogyny, racial or ethnic animus plus violent
means to achieve nefarious ends, is not a comfortable nor
popular position for this author to take. This article does not
defend such speech qua speech; it instead critiques the blanket
suppression of incredibly broad speech categories by social
media platforms, at the direct behest of Congress (with executive
branch help). Blanket suppression of types of social media
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speech that are either not intended to cause imminent illegality,
nor are reasonably likely to cause imminent violence or law-
breaking and fall into no other category of unprotected speech,
risks stifling speech with political value that is necessary for a
participatory democracy. Such restrictions also risk serving as
conduits for large, democratically unaccountable entities to
decide what type of speech the rest of us can hear. This despite
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence calling for greater speech—
even offensive, vile, and potentially harmful speech—not less, if
our democratic experiment is to thrive.
